

THE PERSONALIST



A QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION AND
LITERATURE

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
Published by

THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
3551 UNIVERSITY AVENUE - LOS ANGELES 7 - CALIFORNIA

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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

THE INTELLECTUAL OSTRICH

¶ The intellectual ostrich is a queer bird though not a rare one.

¶ He has an uncanny confidence in words as meeting all the requirements of logic.

¶ Once he has achieved a name for anything he assumes knowledge of it, and the end of inquiry.

¶ Hard pressed for explanation, he jumps into the flimsy maze of technical or professional terms, or the common epithet, and believes himself safe from exposure.

¶ After such an encounter with him, one victim humorously announced himself as an anti-sesquipedalian.

¶ To the intellectual ostrich, slur, inuendo and epithet are more precious than thought.

¶ He is found both among the high and among the lowly, and is the patent source of racial, national, and religious ill-will.

¶ Blinded by the sands of his own prejudices he is quite unconscious of his ludicrous appearance.

¶ Words are too often the refuge of ignorance.

R. T. F.

The Personalist

BEYOND TIME

By the EDITOR

IF WE direct our thought toward the phenomena connected with the living cell, we may observe the achievement of a sort of immortality, the survival of time by the living. But the survival of the simple cell is an impersonal affair. There is a sense in which the first amoeba may be said to form a part and parcel of the latest, but reflection upon the facts will tell us of the carrying along of tendencies, purposes and meanings, that cannot be identified with the substance of the cell itself. If there is an immortality it is an immortality of meaning, or purpose, or spirit, rather than a survival of physical substance, which in the process of growth is being constantly dissipated and renewed. It is not the substance of the cell but rather the imponderables connected with the cell that survive, a consideration deep with meaning for the immortality of the soul of man. As we advance in the progress of evolution, it is the intangible purposes and meaning, the psychic qualities of life that take on increasing emphasis and importance. Nature is "ravin in tooth and claw", and apart from a discernible meaning and prophecy of approaching moral self-consciousness, must appear cruelly impersonal. Our one prospect of establishing a benevolence in Nature, is to turn away from her physical to her moral aspects. If her cycles of death, conflict and savagery, can be seen as essential to the creation in man, far-off, of a consciousness of himself, an awareness of his place and purpose in evolution, the result may have justified the sole means by which there could be voluntary participation in evolution by the evolving creatures themselves. The

"far-off divine event" seems to be the arrival of conscious life at moral freedom. The single cell gives way to a collection of cells, cooperating in an organism, to meet increasing purposes, as the simple organism grows to the more complex, until in the mind and emotional nature of man there appears the possibility of conscious collaboration in the purposes of evolution. The whole process may represent time becoming timeless, as man becomes conscious of the undying and eternal purpose that pervades the universe. As a conscious participant in evolution man occupies a unique position, and the opportunity to create a moral and spiritual world becomes his special privilege and responsibility.

LIFE THE TOKEN OF PERPETUITY

In the whole realm of mysteries, life is the most inexplicable of all. The static world of matter can be easily analyzed, and broken up into its constituent elements. The living organism is only partially susceptible to like analysis. The substantial elements we get in the chemical analysis, but that which differentiates the living cell from matter forever escapes us. There is present an element which is no element, which transcends the elements, and which is able to transform and assimilate them to its own needs and purposes. It is a peculiar irony of our modern outlook that we have considered this functioning reality which subdues matter as less important than matter, even as negligible in scientific inquiry, because it is beyond matter. Not only so, but the power of life, while subject to change, to conquer and increase the store of the world's energy while using it, to cast itself into the future and insure through other organisms its imponderable conquests, these salient facts are most largely neglected. One most significant reality of all realities is the continued triumph of life over the static world. Everywhere there is conflict, yet everywhere life is triumphant, and more triumphant the closer it approaches to full self-consciousness. Seas cannot overwhelm it nor seasons destroy it. It exhibits a tenacious assim-

ilation, gains hardness from peril and disaster, builds recalcitrant matter into something better, releasing powers that were only latent into activities hitherto unexpressible, even non-existent, outside the touch of life. If the world of matter is to be considered a congeries of events, from which our senses draw the interpretations of form and substance, then, outside of perceiving minds or Mind there can be no continuity at all. Whatever there is of perpetuity here is not in matter where we persistently place it, but in the imponderable meanings and qualities, that survive the passage of events. As made up of constantly active forces, the whole of reality at one moment gives way to another whole of reality the next. To unconscious existence there is no relationship between succeeding events, each is a new creation, a new world. This fact supplies the reason why modern outstanding physicists are inclined to cast off as untenable, all claims for causation. Conscious being, in distinction from unconscious, while continually changing, is able to preserve its self-identity as the subject of swiftly passing experiences, which it weaves into the cloth of meaning. The perpetuity which is discoverable in the simplest forms of life is raised therefore to the *n*th power in self-conscious life. As the simple cell, though unconsciously, engraves its character on the life that follows it, so in the higher forms of living self-consciousness it is but reasonable to expect *perpetuity in its kind*, the imponderables of the spirit, righteousness, love, peace and the experience of God. To the person, in a new sense, is given the possibility of becoming creative. He can create a moral and a spiritual world, and if preceding analogies can be said to hold throughout the universe, this higher realm should eventually conquer the lower.

MAN THE NEW STEP IN EVOLUTION

In the self-consciousness of man appears a new element in the evolutionary process, not sentiency to be sure, but something greater than sentiency — moral and purposely creative self-consciousness. The importance of this new arrival cannot be

over-estimated, for it is revolutionary in character. In man we have not only self-consciousness, not only consciousness of other selves, as in the higher animals, we have an expression of reality hitherto lacking: power of reflection upon conscious states, which opens a new world of creative possibility. A new world of sympathy and suffering, of right and wrong, of social duty and moral responsibility, swims into ken. With this comes a power of purpose which can be dedicated to something higher than physical continuance, something nobler than conflict, something which had been but faintly suggested in animal life, struggle for the life and welfare of others. If up to this point life was dedicated to the struggle against the impassive forces of nature, and compelled to wring from its adversities a higher power, so now we find in human existence, the possibility of a superior order of being, that of finding its good in the good of others. Up until the coming of man, such participation in the evolutionary purpose *from within* had been impossible.

If evolutionists and anti-evolutionists have been over-disturbed, or unduly pleased, by the present apparent moratorium in evolution — the incapacity to produce any concrete evidence of present evolution, it might be well for them to examine the power of evolving new species which is now being exercised by man himself, and will be more and more. Henceforth at least, it is apparent, if evolutionary progress is to be made, it is to come through the intellectual and spiritual concurrence of man. With him is the power and with him the responsibility. If one is inclined to feel that he can live for himself alone, and that there is no one over him, the consciousness of his place in the complete order and ongoing of life should give him pause. The world of war, conflict, suffering and disease awaits the redemption which man can bring, once he assumes his true place in cooperation with the Divine. Why does not the All-powerful do it if He is a moral being and desires it done? is a question often put. Because morality cannot be achieved from external circumstance, but only

from within the righteous wills of men. It is impossible for God to create a moral world without the willing assistance of man. When we wish a moral world we shall have one, and one could not be thrust upon us against our wills. It is in man's power to end wrong, war, suffering, and even disease, as soon as men generally wish righteousness to the extent of being righteous. The blessings for which he prays will come when man chooses to spend on peace and well-being, energies equivalent to those he now wastes in war, enslavement and exploitation. A change in the heart of man would instantly usher in a new world. This general condition cannot arrive, however, while we individually shirk responsibility, or refuse in our complacency to act because the task seems great or others are not acting. Each of us is "the missing link" in this new order of evolution.

ETERNAL LIFE IS ETERNAL LIVING

One reason for our personal failure to realize the importance of our own part in the general scheme, is our contempt for the present moment, and for spiritual reality, in relating ourselves to the continuity of the Eternal Order. To take one's self seriously at all, seems like an over-expansion of the ego to the person who is comfortably situated, or not in dire suffering. It is as if a link in a chain should begin to contemplate its smallness compared with the extent of the great chain, and proceed to act on the basis of its own unimportance, in a sort of mock humility. The fact, of course, would be that the whole chain is no stronger than the link, and without it is weakness. We are having serious difficulty in the present world in shuffling off the chrysalis of a selfish animality. War is the price we pay for such make-believe humility and the accompanying complacency with the forces of evil, so long as they seem not to endanger our worldly prospects. Do we say: "All that I ask for is peace"? It may then justly be asked: Peace for what? Peace for self-enjoyment while the greater part of the world rots in poverty, ignorance, disease and slavery? If so, to peace I have no right. Nor can there be peace in the wide

world on such terms. There never can be peace until there is, first of all, righteousness. Must we be ringed about with the unspeakable horrors of universal warfare which takes our bravest and best, before we can realize that we find our good only in the common good, and that our decision and our contribution is of importance to the whole? We place our Heavens, our Utopias and our Hells at a distance, when in fact they are already operative here and now. When will eternal life begin? Not in the dim and distant future, but today. We are indissolubly linked with all time, with all humanity, with the eternal processes that rest in the mind of God. You are as truly a part of the Divine plan and purpose as any event or existence could be, and as such a being, important events hinge on your action and mine.

Why, when we are linked in with the chain of Eternal purpose, should we be content to identify ourselves with an order of life less than eternal, distinctly beneath us, and easily limited to the desires of the flesh, the gossip of the neighborhood, the little outlook of the drawing-room, the office, the kitchen or the shop? If we disclose no eternity in the aspects of the life that now is, how shall we discover eternal life anywhere, for there is a continuity of time which may make one moment as important to the whole as all others.

One other point is impressive also. As it is given us to partake here and now in an eternal order, the eternity of that life in which we partake, forms the most reasonable assurance of future continuity. This world is so full of broken hopes, of half-fulfilled promises, of frustrated dreams that the Supreme Life which can entertain its purposes and see that they survive through millenia of delayed fulfilment, could not leave His cooperator, man, in the dust without the loss of His own moral character. Because He lives, because we are the privileged partakers in His life, we shall live also. We catch the significance of this fact in our deeper moments, and know it must be true if there is to be any justification for creation. As one friend, who has since entered into

the fullness of knowledge, once expressed it: "Without immortality, creation is a mess."

THE SCOPE OF LIFE

Most of us are fond of expressing our modesty by thinking of ourselves as nonentities, though we are immediately offended if anyone agrees with us. Our ideal seems to be that we are set here for the particular intensification of animal enjoyments. Privileged with creative powers we use them to increase our stock of food, or friends, or publicity, or cash, a thousand things which, compared with our real mission, are the merest baubles, tinsel of specious joys and empty satisfactions. In this effort we strive to jolly ourselves into a good time, and to feed our vanity with achievements that can only leave a deeper and undying thirst. The men of anyone's acquaintance these days, who have peace of mind and soul, can be counted on the fingers of a single hand. Yet we have ways and means of physical satisfaction of which our fathers never dreamed. The more we have, the more we demand. Our disease of discontent can never be cured so long as we do nothing to realize our place and relationship in the eternal order. Our unhappiness comes from being misfits in a world that anticipates eventually the creation of a new heaven and a new earth. It is as if a giant were attempting to content himself with the employment of all his time and strength with the playthings of the nursery. Capacity he has to create, to fulfil a lot and destiny so superb as to be beyond computation by reason of the forces physical, mental and spiritual, that are his. These could fill up the vacuum of his life and transform his powers but, engrossed in infantile pleasure, our giant spends his energies in playing jack-straws. One reason that most of us are so mightily "absent from the Lord" is because we are so exceedingly "present in the body", so engrossed with matters of small account. Given the possibilities of souls, with power to embrace the universe, all time, and all existence, we are content to spend our days as "a tale of little meaning". Paul saw how easy it was for men to busy

themselves with the affairs of the body asking, what shall we eat, what shall we drink, wherewithal shall we be clothed, who shall we invite, where shall we go, are we in the Blue-book, none of which are of primary importance. Yet we, with God-given souls, occupy our whole time with these things, being present in the body but forever absent from the Lord. The only chance of restoring our equanimity, of recovering the lost way of peace is to put ourselves back into the chain of Divine relationships expressed by Paul as being "present with the Lord". The army is by so much ineffective, if one after another of the troops that should be present has to be written down as "absent or unaccounted for". Yet as far as the creation of a new world which lies within the making of our hands is concerned, we are too often content to leave it to others. We need to realize our place in the Divine plan, that our lives are a part of the intricate pattern of universal life, that ages have been working toward the ends upon which we have come, and that failure to stand up and be counted is delaying the final result. We have recently had opportunity during days of war, to know the helplessness of the men at the front if the men and women in factory and home skimmed the supplies. Nor does this mean that we should all have crowded to the trenches, to make a mock-heroic stand there at work which others were better prepared to do. It means rather that in the making of a new world we are to begin where we are, with the capacities that are ours, and to commence in these ways and days to live after an eternal order. Our part may seem to us small and of little account to the Supreme Continuum, but in His keeping the smallest loyalty fully given can be made to grow to greatness and power. If one is but an acorn there is no need to worry at not being a giant oak. All that is needed is to fulfil the functions of an acorn and the Divine Architect will provide the oak. How can we in the face of opportunities, of kingdoms, principalities and powers, and worlds to come, fail in our little place? We must not, however insignificant, be absent from our part in

the Divine wholeness.

BEYOND TIME

In the light of such considerations there is little use to inquire about the prospects for immortality. The more appropriate question might be whether we have anything about our hopes and aspirations, or plan of life, which hooks up with the whole order and smacks of immortality. To have our present life and aspirations eternally extended would be to most of us the acme of boredom. Here we are filled with discontents, and there is no peace. Misfortune, loss, disillusionment hem us in on every side. To think of this lasting forever would be the contemplation of calamity. How can we change it? By reaching beyond time: by an act of faith which will constitute us a living part of the life-forces of time and eternity. Knowledge! What is that? Knowledge is only of things we see, and compass. Faith takes hold of that which does not yet appear, is a portion of the forces of life and progress, links up with creative powers, brings the non-existent into being. The creative life can never be boresome. Read the long roll of the world's geniuses who through faith wrought righteousness, stopped the mouths of lions, out of weakness were made strong, and put to flight the armies of the aliens. Life was for them one grand adventure. In their echoes hear the bugle-call to a larger world, *your* larger world.

AN ETHICAL GOAL FOR THE ATOMIC AGE

By DANIEL SOMMER ROBINSON

THE most urgent philosophical problem of the Atomic Age is the ethical one. The best informed experts quite generally agree that the invention of the atomic bomb has given man a weapon that is likely to be developed to a point of efficiency where it actually could be used to destroy all civilization upon this planet. Moreover, there are other instrumentalities besides atomic bombs which might conceivably destroy civilization. Poisonous gases used in chemical warfare, and disease producing germs widely disseminated in a bacteriological warfare could do it. According to General George C. Marshall's last Annual Report, World War II was ninety-eight per cent technological. All of these facts push into the focus of ethical reflection this crucial question: Should science be ethically conditioned to prevent a catastrophic destructive exploitation of human knowledge in technological warfare? This ethical question presents a genuinely philosophical problem peculiar to the Atomic Age which is of the utmost importance.

In interpreting this principle of the ethical conditioning of science, two problems arise. First, the principle is itself somewhat ambiguous. Secondly, it can only be justified as an ethical principle by a clear statement of the ethical goal of the Atomic Age and of its relation to this principle. Each of these problems calls for separate discussion.

The chief ambiguity in the principle of the ethical conditioning of science is exposed when we attempt to interpret and apply it to the pursuit of scientific knowledge. For it is generally agreed that pure science is an intrinsic value along with the cultural values of art, religion, and philosophy. In fact it comes under truth in the classic trivium of cultural values: truth, goodness, and beauty. Surely no philosopher would wish to advocate an ethical conditioning of the pursuit of truth, that being regarded as itself constituting a part of the very essence of morality. This

difficulty can be expressed in another way. The pursuit of truth presupposes freedom of the scientist to carry on investigative research. In order to be science, pure science must be free to attack any problem that presents itself. And any attempt to condition pure science ethically would hamper that freedom, unless it were a self-conditioning in which scientists would impose ethical restrictions upon themselves. Consequently the principle of the ethical conditioning of science by government or the community is inapplicable to the pursuit of pure science because it would be unethical to impose restrictions. That is why recent imposition of restrictions on scientists working in the field of nuclear physics by military authorities in the interest of national security is judged by many to be unethical.

The argument against such restrictions can be put in the form of a dilemma: If the atomic bomb is a war weapon, it should not be under exclusive military control because of the international furor and disturbance that is created by the knowledge that one nation alone possesses such a weapon, and if it is not a war weapon, it should not be under exclusive military control because military authorities would then be encroaching upon civilian activities. Obviously an opponent could take this dilemma by the first horn. Admitting that the atomic bomb is a war weapon, a militarist could insist that for security reasons we had better safeguard our own national interest regardless of whatever international repercussions may arise from our so doing. But unfortunately this would be no real escape, since another alternative must then be faced: if we safeguard our knowledge of atomic energy by strict military censorship, we will so curb the free exchange of ideas among scientists of different nations as to prevent improvements in the bomb. In all probability we could never have made the bomb in the first place without a free interchange of ideas among scientists from many different national groups, and certainly such cooperation must be continued to prevent a growing decadence of pure science.

Thus the real dilemma with which we are confronted is an ethical one. If the pursuit of truth by pure science is an intrinsic cultural value, it is unethical to restrict such an ethical pursuit; and if freedom of scientists is essential to investigative research, it is unethical to restrict such freedom. Does this dilemma force the paradoxical conclusion that the ethical conditioning of science is an unethical principle?

Fortunately, it is not necessary to interpret the principle of the ethical conditioning of science to mean the placing of any restrictions whatsoever upon pure science. That military authorities have done so only proves their lack of a complete philosophical and ethical comprehension of the actual situation. For its hostility to pure science at the beginning of the modern scientific era, as expressed in the burning of Bruno at the stake and the forcing of Galileo to retract his statement about the earth moving, the Church has rightly been condemned. Any government that restricts in any way the pursuit of pure scientific knowledge *ipso facto* injures its own people. Scientists must have freedom from dictatorial interference in order that they may be free to pursue the truth that can be so beneficial to human well-being.

This means that the principle of the ethical conditioning of science must itself be restricted to technology. Pure knowledge *per se* harms no one. But the technological exploitation of scientific knowledge can be either beneficial or harmful depending upon how it is used. The technological control of atomic energy can be so directed as to bestow incalculable benefits upon the human race, or so as to accomplish the suicide of civilization. Former Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, has well said that the focus of the problem "resides in the hearts of men" rather than in the atom. (Harpers' Magazine, Vol. 192, No. 1150, March 1946, p. 204). Just because the focus of the problem does reside in the hearts of men it is necessary that an authority be created which can impose ethical restrictions upon the technological

development of scientific knowledge. The fact that scientists know how to make atomic bombs is no reason why they should be made or used for war weapons. To insist that the fruits of investigative research shall be used only for beneficial purposes is no restriction upon the freedom of scientists to carry on such research. This clarifies the ambiguity in the principle of the ethical conditioning of science, and leads to this conclusion: It is unethical to use this principle to restrict pure scientific inquiry, but it is ethical to use it to prevent the production or use of technological equipment to destroy civilization.

Now let us consider the deeper theoretical ethical problem implied in the principle of the ethical conditioning of science. Having accepted that principle as binding for technology it is incumbent upon us to explain why it is binding, or, in other words, to justify its validity as an ethical principle. But to do this we must face the basic ethical problem of the Atomic Age. Put in the form of a question, that problem is: What is the ethical goal of the Atomic Age? For until we know what this goal is, the principle of the ethical conditioning of science cannot even be formulated accurately. It can be stated in three ways, as a simple moral maxim, as an ideal of human perfectibility, and as a social principle.

There is a simple moral maxim which all of the world's living religions acknowledge, and the acceptance of which is also compatible with humanism, agnosticism, and unbelief. That maxim is the positive and negative forms of the Golden Rule, the negative form being known as the Silver Rule. Combining both forms we get this supreme moral law or rule of conduct: Do not do unto other persons what you would not want them to do unto you but do for them what you would want them to do for you. Loyalty to this maxim is possible for any moral agent, anywhere and anytime. It is the essence of universal beneficence. It can be adopted by any individual as a personal motto, and it can be practiced so as to further both self-realiza-

tion and social justice.

It is generally agreed that the Golden Rule performs two functions as a moral maxim. It simply states the way in which each person should treat every other person with whom he has dealings. This is its constructive function and there is no justification for misconstruing the kind of conduct it dictates. But whenever it is violated, it also serves as a reminder that a wrong act has been performed. This is its negative function as the voice of conscience, and no morally sensitive person can fail to recognize its quirks when he violates this maxim.

Nevertheless for highly civilized people the Golden Rule is inadequate as a full and complete formulation of the moral goal. One can see why if he imagines a tribe of Eskimos all of whose members are persons who treat others as persons in strict compliance with this maxim. In a society or communal life, where human beings struggle constantly with an inhospitable environment, there is perforce a dire lack of the higher cultural values of the classical trivium — truth, goodness, and beauty. Consequently for highly civilized people the Golden Rule must be philosophically enriched before it can become an adequate ethical goal.

A widely held conception of the moral ideal is expressed in a superb poem. Sojourning in Italy one hundred and twenty-seven years ago, when he was at the height of his poetic powers and enjoying the happiest months of his life, the British poet Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote *Prometheus Unbound*, certainly one of the greatest poetical achievements in English literature, and one which contains a special message for people of the Atomic Age. Shortly before Shelley reduced to sublime poetry his unique theory of the moral perfectibility of human nature through the eradication of hate and the enthronement of perfect insight and self-mastery in the souls of men, he had made his famous translation of Plato's *Symposium*, which he entitled *The Banquet*. Shelley was an ardent social reformer who viewed the world of

human affairs *sub specie aeternitatis*. He seems to have written *Prometheus Unbound* under the inspiration of a mystical union with Plato's eternal form or idea of pure beauty, and to have followed the advice he has Mercury give Prometheus:

Yet pause, and plunge
Into Eternity, where recorded time,
Even all that we imagined, age on age,
Seems but a point, . . .

From that vantage point the poet formulated an ideal of the conceivable extreme limit of what the moral potentialities of human life would be, if ethical perfectibility were to replace ill-will and hate in all persons.

The loathsome mask has fallen, the man remains
Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man
Equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless,
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the king
Over himself; just, gentle, wise; but man
Passionless—no, yet free from guilt or pain,
Which were, for his will made or suffered them;
Not yet exempt, though ruling them like slaves,
From chance, and death, and mutability.

And to this exalted description of the good man, freed from fear and hate, he adds another:

To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory!

One need not fully agree with all of Shelley's ethical conceptions to appreciate the value of the moral ideal of human perfectibility so sublimely expressed in these matchless lines. If all persons would live their lives so as to achieve a titanic, Promethean self-mastery, such perfectibility, as the poet describes, would be built into their character and personality, and this would surely produce a better world. Yet everyone knows how difficult it is for men to perform their mundane duties while

translated into that empyrean which Shelley elsewhere describes as "the abode where the eternal are." Even the intuitions and visions of eternity of saints and mystics are of short duration. Our lives on earth are a continuous struggle to overcome the forces of evil, to build a better and higher cultural order than was our own heritage, and to rescue from the stream of time, and transmute to an eternal significance our own personal being. Consequently not only the Golden Rule, but Shelley's Promethean self-mastery requires philosophical elaboration and interpretation, and it is now incumbent upon us to suggest such an interpretation. This involves an exposition of the ethical goal as a social principle.

Thomas Hill Green wrote what has been judged by a competent authority to be the greatest work on moral philosophy produced in England during the nineteenth century. It bore the title *Prolegomena to Ethics*. In that classic treatise he adapted to ethical use the phrase *common good*. In Scotland this phrase has an economic meaning. It refers to the funds willed to a community for a permanent endowment, the income of which is to be used for the benefit of communal activities and institutions. Green elaborated this concept into a moral ideal. He interpreted the common good socially to mean a moral order or community within which every member can find a scope for the full realization of his or her spiritual capacities. This ideal has passed into popular usage so that frequently one hears or reads the expression "the common good" used as a moral standard to judge the rightness or wrongness of acts either of individuals or of groups. Acts which promote the common good are rightly praised, and those which injure the common good are justly condemned by all moral persons. Hence this concept, properly interpreted, can be used by any moral person as a philosophical standard of judgment, embodying at the highest level of reflective morality, the essence both of the Golden Rule and of the ideal of human perfectibility.

What, then, is the Common Good philosophically comprehended? To Green it was *his community*, and that means the Britain of the late nineteenth century spiritually interpreted as a social unity of cultural institutions in which all citizens participated, and by and through their participation at once enriched the total cultural values of the nation and grew inwardly into self-conscious moral beings. This is an essential interpretation of the place that any man's community occupies in his moral development. Note that while this use of the word "community" includes political society, it by no means identifies a community with its government. Without an actually existing moral order embodied in cultural institutions human life sinks back into savagery. And anthropology teaches us that even among savage communities the complex social organization shapes the growth of every member of the tribe. Thus it is an inescapable fact, rightly emphasized by John Dewey and James H. Tufts in their widely used Ethics textbook, that moral development passes from customary morality, where the cake of custom controls, to reflective moral behavior, where men consciously and intelligently shape their own spiritual and moral development by freely selecting such ends as are possible within the culture to which they belong. The common good is the ethical essence of a living spiritual community, composed of self-determining and self-realizing persons constituting an interdependent society. Or to put it differently, it is a civilized human society functioning morally through the varied, continuous, and cultivated training it gives to every individual personality who participates in it.

That this is what Green understood by the common good is clearly shown by three brief but highly significant passages from the chapter of *Prolegomena to Ethics*, which he entitled *Characteristics of the Moral Ideal*. He writes: "There can be nothing in a nation however exalted its mission, or in a society however perfectly organized, which is not in the persons composing the nation or the society. Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal

of *personal* worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person." "The idea of a spirit cannot realize itself except in spirits. . . . The spiritual progress of mankind is thus an unmeaning phrase, unless it means a progress *of* personal character and *to* personal character — a progress of which feeling, thinking, and willing subjects are the agents and sustainers, and of which each step is a fuller realization of the capacities of such subjects." "In saying that the human spirit can only be fulfilled in and through persons, we are not denying but affirming that the realization and *fulfilment can only take place in and through society.*"

Green clearly and succinctly expresses in these passages the personalistic social conception of the moral ideal as this has unfolded through centuries of ethical reflection. He must not be interpreted as stating here merely his own isolated and arbitrary opinions, but as the authentic voice of an ethical and spiritual philosophy of life that has always been ably defended in every important society and in every historical period in the development of Western culture. What Green and his distinguished contemporaries and disciples — the two Cairds, Bradley, Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison, Ward, Sorley and others — proclaimed in England was ably promulgated in this country by Bowne, Royce, Palmer, Ladd and other prominent American philosophers. It is, in fact, the ethical essence of all idealistic philosophy, but especially that of a theistic and personalistic type. Consider, for example, this excellent statement from Borden Parker Bowne's *Principles of Ethics*: "The ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less as this ideal is more or less approximated. For man the attainment of this good involves the perfection of individual life and of social relations. For man the good is perfectly realizable only in and through the co-working of the community; indeed, the good exists mainly in a social form. Hence virtue itself largely takes on the form of working

for the common good; and unselfishness is often set forth as the chief if not the sole virtue. The realization of normal human possibilities is, then, the only conception possible of human good." (P. 69)

In Green's day the larger community to which a citizen belongs functioned primarily through relatively small and well integrated local communities such as towns, cities, and provincial regions. There was a common life in these smaller communities and most of the members of these communities knew one another personally. Today we face an important new development. A wide variety and a large number of *special communities* have come into existence, each of which covers as extensive a geographical area as the general community and functions effectively in mediating cultural values to its constituents. A special community may be defined as any well organized association or institution composed of trained persons who are united together in pursuit of a common purpose or set of interests. For example, in this country we have such special communities as our great industrial companies, trade associations, and labor unions, professional associations such as the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, and the National Education Association, a varied assortment of scientific and learned societies, including every university and college with all of their students, alumni, faculties, trustees, and benefactors. Now each such special community embodies a special good which its members seek to preserve and enhance, and which they share to the point of developing a spirit of loyalty to their special community that often surpasses their sense of obligation to the general community. Today a local community such as a great urban center is frequently much less closely integrated than are these various special communities. Consequently important moral conflicts arise between the special good of some particular community and that of another, or between the special good of a special community and the common good of the more inclusive

general community. Solving such conflicts is a major task of social ethics for which we have to train a specialized personnel, and in the Atomic Age this will become increasingly important.

In the Atomic Age it is no longer possible to restrict the conception of a general moral community to the particular state or nation in which one holds citizenship. Technology makes possible a genuine world community. Indeed this is one of its primary ethical functions. One task of people of the Atomic Age is to build such a community. Instead of settling international disputes by force, we must settle them by law. It is essential that everything possible be done to promote international understanding. There must be an intercultural exchange of ideas, of scientists, of professors, and of students. Unquestionably if general agreement could be reached to use the conception of the common good of a world community as the ethical goal of the Atomic Age, it is a principle which would necessarily draw all men together. Given a universal ethical goal on which there is wide agreement, and the growth of world community follows as inevitably as day follows night. Hence ethics must come to the aid of technology, education, politics and religion to build a real world community.

Using this conception of the common good as the ethical goal of the Atomic Age it is possible to formulate clearly and definitely the meaning of the principle of the ethical conditioning of science, and to justify that principle so far as its application to the technological development of pure science is concerned. For we can now say: All technological developments must be regulated and controlled by the acid test of whether they promote the common good supported by the common moral sense of mankind. Now when there is virtually unanimous agreement among scientists themselves that atomic bombs and poisonous gases are actually capable of destroying civilization, then there is a sound ethical reason for preventing their manufacture, or, in case they are useful for other than military purposes, for

strictly controlling their production. Unless technology is made to conform to the ethical goal of promoting the common good of all peoples the very foundations of our civilized existence are endangered. Social knowledge and spiritual wisdom which will control the application of the findings of science to a noble purpose, are especially needed and such knowledge and wisdom is not to be found in science and technology *per se*. They are to be found only in an ethical determination to realize man's highest cultural values.

Faced with the wriggling nest of ethical problems which has been exposed to view by the crackling of the atom, ethical thinkers should realize how utterly futile and unworthy it is to quarrel and bicker over moral peccadillos. Even the major disputes that tend to divide thinkers into opposite schools of thought pale into insignificance beside the urgent need of complete intellectual and moral cooperation on the part of all persons of good-will in meeting the world-wide moral crisis of our day. To be specific those of us who are theists need to seek the good in the humanist ethical ideal, just as those who are humanists should seek the common good by practicing a tolerant attitude toward the theist ideal of human conduct. Perhaps such a spirit of cooperation in the pursuit of the common good of all humanity, spiritually and culturally interpreted, would be promoted by a brief and succinct statement of the distinctive meaning both of humanist and of theist interpretations of the ethical goal of mankind.

The ethical ideal of humanism has a maximal and a minimal meaning. The minimal meaning concerns the contemporary human situation, and the maximal meaning takes in man's ultimate destiny on this planet. A simple statement of the minimal meaning is: It is the duty and personal responsibility of every citizen and every communal association to cooperate in conserving our cultural values through the creation of an international government that can prevent the outbreak of a cataclysmic tech-

nological war. And a simple statement of the maximal meaning is: The possibilities of a further enhancement of cultural values and the indefinite perpetuation of an increasingly enriched cultural order are unlimited, providing the energies organized to achieve the minimal objective are united behind a mighty world-wide plan to achieve the utmost of which free men are capable. Why should a theist have any objection to either of these statements of the humanist ideal? Only when we narrow the meaning to what no humanist would assert, as for example when we interpret the humanist to be seeking only comfort for everybody, or when we look at the negative side and stress his lack of metaphysics, or his failure to do justice to eternity, owing to his bias and enthusiasm for temporal existence, can we really attack the humanist position. On its negative side, considering what it omits the humanist ideal undoubtedly is weak, but on its positive side both its minimal and its maximal form are a consummation every theist might well desire for the human race.

What is the ethical ideal of the theist? It has three facets of meaning. First, every theist believes that persons are in a direct relationship with God, and are therefore under obligations to worship God and to develop their individual moral character and personality under the guidance and control of the idea of the perfection of God. Whether he be Jew, Mohammedan, Christian, or a representative of any other religious faith, a theist makes the love and worship of God the basis of his conduct. Secondly, every theist is a believer in the reality as well as the ideality of a religious community whose welfare he is under obligation to promote throughout his life, howsoever he may differ with his fellow theists in the interpretation of that community. And third, theists refuse to restrict human destiny to what is achieved culturally in the historical process of emergent evolution here on this planet. Every theist believes in the reality of a metaphysical moral order in which both the individual person and the religious community share, thereby transmuting

their finite existence into eternity. Now what real reason can a sincere humanist have for objecting to this threefold theistic ideal? Only when he narrowly interprets it to mean an impractical otherworldly philosophy of life, or to involve a dogged hostility to the betterment of human earthly society, can a humanist find anything in the theist ideal over which he personally should be concerned. And on the other hand, a theist can easily incorporate both the minimal and the maximal meanings of the humanist ideal into his own doctrine of the common good all men are obligated to promote.

Why, then, should not humanists and theists cease their internecine warfare? If they will respect each other's sincerity of purpose, they can mutually agree to promote the common good. For if universally adopted as the ethical goal of the Atomic Age, this concept is capable of transcending and synthesizing the ideals of both humanists and theists. To establish peace and concord among the nations, to bring about an interpenetration of cultures as a basis for a world community, to support international law and the United Nations so as to prevent the outbreak of another technological world war, and to minister to the scattered remnants of humanity who today roam the earth homeless, hopeless, and apathetic, surely such aims constitute a social plan and program with a range and scope that is sufficient to absorb the energies of all the good people of the earth, whether they do or do not possess religious faith.

Providing human beings do not perfect and use atomic bombs to blow the aero-teraqueous globe into a cloud of nebulous gases, astronomers tell us there will be ample time in which to realize even the highest hopes of humanists with respect to the improvement of terrestrial civilization. Sir James Jeans writes: "As inhabitants of the earth, we are living at the very beginning of time. We have come into being in the fresh glory of the dawn, and a day of almost unthinkable length stretches before us with unimaginable opportunities for accomplishment. . . . The main

message of astronomy is one of hope to the race and of responsibility to the individual — of responsibility because we are drawing plans and laying foundations for a longer future than we can well imagine." (*The Universe Around Us*, pp. 340-341).

If every morally accountable person would accept his share of this responsibility, the Atomic Age would embody the greatest concentration of creative moral energy history has yet known, and human cultural achievements would attain a higher plateau than even the most Golden Age of any previous era. This is a consummation devoutly to be wished, and we dare hope that it forms a portion of the earthly destiny of the human race. But the fulness of that destiny God alone comprehends. Our times, our hopes, and our specific plans are under divine providence.

SOME DEFINITIONS FOR PERSONALISTS

By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

EVER SINCE Socrates noticed that the average man used words without knowing what they mean, it has been clear that it is well for us to be aware of what we are talking about. In spite of the dissemination of education, dictionaries, encyclopaedias, science, and philosophy, we are still largely in the dark. Even scientists sometimes resent being asked to define their terms; it is fashionable to say that definition is impossible until the close of investigation, so that many investigators proceed through a veritable jungle and welter of vagueness, firmly and almost resentfully declining all invitations to tell what the strange words mean. Semanticists and symbolic logicians, it is true, see the need for accuracy in thought, and propound admirable theories. But when they venture into the arena where words are the weapons, they are often more mystifying, less clear, and less precise than ordinary mortals.

If anyone, wearying of the strife of unknown tongues, propounds a definition, he is told, (1) that definitions are merely verbal and have no bearing on reality (which if true proves that all words are empty and we'd better spend all our time in mute pointing)¹, and also, to clinch the case, (2) that definitions are dogmas that congeal thought (which, if true, is a veto on every clear hypothesis as well as on all self-criticism or criticism by others). These two vetoes occur so often in current literature that they have come to acquire an aura of fashionable sanctity. But a moment's reflection shows that they are futile and self-defeating. If no definition can refer to anything real, language is useless in a real world; and if definitions are necessarily dogmatic,

1. See Hall's critical treatment of definitionism in his essay on "Metaphysics" in D. D. Runes (ed.) *Twentieth Century Philosophy*.

then we must choose between dogmatism and meaningless muttering. If it came to that, it would be better to have dogmas that mean something than grunts and groans with no meaning at all. The truth is (1) that the function of definitions is to define the real (what it is, how it acts, how we are related to it, or act on it) and (2) that definitions are hypotheses subject to further inquiry. The process of thought, like the dialectic of Hegel, is a process of continual redefinition or at least of critical re-examination of definitions. There is no reason why any definition should be laid away in moth-balls; but, equally, there is no reason why any definition should be changed unless it can be improved.

The remainder of this paper consists of definitions proposed in the spirit of the foregoing discussion. They have been subjected to criticism for some time by the writer and others. Obviously, they express his convictions about the nature of the real, not merely his expectations about how words shall be used. Readers are, however, invited to criticize the proposed definitions with both questions in mind: (1) Do the definitions indicate legitimate uses of the words? and (2) Do the definitions define reality (objects, experience, being) as it is? If not, in either case, why not? No apology is offered for the fact that these definitions owe much, explicitly or implicitly, to thinkers as various as Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bowne, Knudson, Flewelling, Allport, Santayana, Sellars, Williams, and Dewey.

The Datum. (1) A datum is always mental, someone's conscious experience. For epistemology, the datum is all actual present consciousness. The present is what is grasped in a simultaneous whole. The datum is what is given, the "specious present," the field of attention (including fringe), the stream of consciousness (as now present), present experience (including every actual conscious event or process — all *qualia*, desires, preferences, choices, judgments, reasonings, memories, feelings, emotions). Royce calls it the time-span. The whole datum is a self,

which is a process of perpetual change and activity. It consists of "ingredients of conscious experience of human minds"; see Donald Williams, *Jour. Phil.*, 30 (1933), 617. (But "ingredient" connotes, wrongly, an element enjoying a being of its own separate from the mind; "of minds" is synonymous with "of conscious experience.") (2) In addition, the word "datum" may be used to designate what is taken as the starting point of any investigation; for example, a problematic situation prior to inquiry. (3) It may also mean, as The Given in my special theory, what is not produced by will, such as the laws of reason and the facts of sense.—Any item or set of items in a datum, short of the whole present datum that is designated is *an aspect of the datum*.

Attention. This is a fundamental property of a datum. (1) Attention is the fact that certain aspects of the datum-field, called the focus, are more conspicuous (clearer, and more compelling) than others, which are called the fringe. (There may be subordinate foci in any datum; one may read philosophy and listen to Charlie McCarthy at the same time). *Voluntary attention* is attention initiated by a choice or preference within the datum, that is, the focus is voluntarily selected and held to for some time. *Involuntary attention* is attention contrary to choice, when voluntary attention strives elsewhere. It may be due to unexpected changes, such as unusual sounds, strong desires (apart from their rational control), or signs of danger. *Nonvoluntary attention* is attention from which all direct relation to choice is absent. It is volitionally neutral. We cannot be sure whether the entire field of attention in all its foci is ever absolutely nonvoluntary. There almost always arises some voluntary striving for or against the objects of what was at first nonvoluntary attention. Attention is never absent from the datum (1).

Essence. This word, used in many historic senses, is best taken in general harmony with the theory of critical realism. (1) Essence, then, is the experienced quality or *quale* of any datum or

any aspect of any datum. It is intuition itself; not, as Santayana believes, its object. Hence the term refers to what is presented in the very datum. The presence of an essence is experience, but not knowledge (which comes only after testing and inquiry). (2) It may also be used to designate a property of anything without which that thing would not be itself. When we confront a pair of shoes, the experience of a shiny, black *gestalt* in the datum is essence in sense (1), but not in sense (2); for when the shoes are befouled with mud, uppers and soles (the essence (2) of a pair of shoes) is still there.

Intuition. Intuition (etymologically, looking at) is any relatively simple aspect, or group of aspects, of the datum attended to, apart from any relations to a reasoning process. For example, every *quale* (sensuous datum, emotional datum, etc.) is an intuition. An intuition may or may not be taken as a description of something other than the datum. Dreams, mathematical entities, sense *qualia*, are all intuitions, whatever else they may be or imply. This is close to Santayana's conception of intuition. There is no reason to suppose that any intuition, taken as such, is to be trusted as insight into truth, although it may well prove to be a valuable clue or hypothesis.

Judgment. A judgment, as an act of judging, is any aspect of the datum which describes (whether truly or falsely) something other than itself, either before or after inquiry. The "something else" is called the object of the judgment. Every distinguishable intuition is related to a judgment. The meaning or content of a judgment, when stated in words, is called a sentence or a proposition. Modern symbolic logic assumes that a proposition is a judgment-meaning taken in abstraction from any datum. The description of an other (an object) is the objective reference of the judgment. The datum-self in which a judgment occurs may be called the judge or the judger. The other or object may be a possible datum for the "whole self" ("future self") of the judge, or of other judges, or, if personalism is false, of no judge.

Judgment implies epistemological dualism: that is, the act of judging or of knowing is never identical with the object judged or known. Hence the mentalism presupposed (see datum) requires a constant relation between the mind and its environment. Dewey's conception of the mental and of mentalism in his *Logic* is entirely inconsistent with the personalistic view (which requires not only objective reference to, but real interaction with, the environment).

Truth. Any judgment or set of judgments which describes its object as it is (was, or will be) is a truth or set of truths. "Jesus Christ was an Aryan" is not a truth. "The datum is complex" is a truth. The possession of truth by a datum-self is called *Knowledge*, when the true judgment has been tested by appropriate criteria, experiments, or inquiries.

Belief. The process in a datum-self which treats a judgment or hypothesis as true. Belief is synonymous with acknowledgment, or acceptance, or supposition (*Annahme*).

Hypothesis. A process initiated in a datum-self, which proposes a judgment as possibly (thinkably) true, defines the conditions under which it would be true, and sets forth its implications and involvements (see Dewey for these terms). An hypothesis is *tested* when it is found whether these conditions, implications, and involvements are found in experience or not.

Proof. The process of showing: (1) The self-consistency of an hypothesis intended to interpret some aspect or aspects of the datum. (2) Its consistency with all aspects of the datum including verified hypotheses. Proof is often called verification. *Verification* is the discovery of aspects of the datum which are fully coherent with the hypothesis, together with evidence of the absence of contradictory data. Verification, therefore, depends on continuous, precise, memory of the original hypothesis, on success in complete inspection of all the data, and on perfectly sound reasoning about the relations between the hypothesis and the data. (3) Its superiority to all competing hypotheses for the

purpose of interpreting the datum. This requires, ideally, the consideration of all possible hypotheses. On account of (2) and (3) (assuming that (1) may be seen by intuition), all proof must remain in the realm of incompletely verified hypothesis; hence all knowledge is belief, but it is verified or tested belief (Dewey's warranted assertibility) as against arbitrary belief.

Whole Self. The datum is a "datum self". The whole self is present datum plus the past data which are in principle capable of being related to the present datum by memory linkages (which identify the past data as belonging to the same self), plus the future data for which what is now present will be regarded as a past remembered datum. The present datum can now refer to the future datum by linkages of expectation or anticipation-linkages, as they may be called. The consciousness of recognition in memory and of self-identification are necessary to a whole self. The experience of the datum-self involves the truth that there is a whole self.

Other Selves. Every normal datum self not only believes that it is a member of a whole self, but also believes that there are other selves. No datum can believe itself to be all that there is without abandoning the task of interpretation.

Person. A person is a self capable of reason (interpretation) and value (satisfactions—empirical or ideal).

Coherence. Coherence consists of fulfilment of the norms: Be consistent, be systematic, be inclusive, be analytic, be synoptic, be active, be open to alternatives, be critical, and be decisive. Coherence is a synonym of reason.

Interpretation. A process within a whole self whereby the datum is understood, i.e., is treated coherently. Contradictory judgments are so treated that one is believed and the other is disbelieved, or interpretation is postponed and judgment suspended. The aim of interpretation is fully consistent belief (see Proof).

Existence. (1) The existence of selves consists of data inter-

puted as belonging to a system in time (system of time-spans), such that every aspect of every datum is either before or after or simultaneous with every other. All selves have history; personal existence is history. There is no timeless personal existence. (2) The existence of nature consists of experienced objects which belong to a unified system of space and time. Nature may conceivably be wholly data (as I believe) or partly data (as naturalists believe) or not data at all (as Santayana and Democritus held).

Reality. The object of true judgments is called reality. All judgments about reality are beliefs, for reasons previously stated. Reality is what we are thinking about when we are thinking coherently, and so, truly; it is the goal of thought, the meaning of all experience. For the personalist, God, the Supreme Person, is the supreme reality, the *ens realissimum*.

In addition to the foregoing fundamental, but incomplete, set of definitions, a few more definitions are added from an earlier "Platform". They were agreed upon, after long discussion by Professors Mary W. Calkins and Edgar S. Brightman, May 25, 1929, less than a year before her death, and have been often re-examined since. They may be compared with the definitions above; part of their intent is to show resemblances and differences between singularistic or absolutistic personalism (Calkins) and pluralistic personalism (Brightman). They were originally called "A Platform of Personalistic Idealism." The definitions follow:

1. The *Universe* is completely mental in nature. [Here the term "universe" means all-that-there-is, including God and man, nature and supernature.]²

2. Every mental *Existent* is either a self, or else a part, aspect, phase or process of a self. The term *Person* is used of selves capable of reasoning and ideal valuations. [It is, of course,

2. Material added in square brackets was not in the original "platform" agreed on by Professors Calkins and Brightman, but is an addition by the latter.

presupposed that all selves are in interaction with their environment and are dependent on it; this environment includes the body, which, by definition, is mental.]

3. The *Physical Universe* may be regarded as the direct experiencing and willing of one cosmic person,³ or as a system of infra-human selves [as in panpsychism, to which, for all her absolutism, Miss Calkins was inclined], or as a system of ideas in the minds of finite persons [as in McTaggart's personalism].

4. The *Total Universe* is a system of selves and persons, who may be regarded either as members of one all-inclusive person who individuates them by the diversity of his purposing [the Hegel-Royce-Calkins view], or as a society of many selves related by common purposes [the Bowne view].

5. Every *Self* directly experiences itself.

6. The self knows some *Other Selves* indirectly, by inference [so that epistemological dualism is true on the human plane, a point that troubled Miss Calkins considerably, in view of the ultimate epistemological monism of her absolutistic theory].

7. Any *Metaphysical Theory* (except materialism which denies facts of direct experience) about the quality of reality or the number of ultimately distinct beings is compatible with all scientific observations and with scientific laws conceived either (a) as generalizations of observed sequences or (b) as statistical formulations of average behavior [which latter view, going back to Clifford's hints, was viewed favorably by Royce and is accepted by many contemporary scientists]. But philosophy is dependent upon the facts revealed by the sciences for its conception not only of the structure of the universe but also of its values and purposes.

8. *Aesthetics* and *Ethics* are based on psychological doctrines concerning the valuing consciousness, but go beyond descriptive psychology both in their normative aspects and also in their

3. The term "cosmic person" is understood to include both the God of theism and the Absolute Person (of absolute idealism).

metaphysical implication of beauty and goodness in the universe.

9. Similarly, the science of *Religion* is primarily a psychological and historical [and sociological] discipline; but the object of the religious consciousness, God, may be identified with a metaphysical object—the cosmic person.⁴

4. Any interested reader is invited to submit his ideas—criticisms, questions or additions—to Professor Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Box 35, Newton Center 59, Massachusetts.

GEIJER¹: SWEDISH PERSONALIST

By VIOLA SPONGBERG

GEIJER'S general position in philosophy may be described as an historical realism. Indeed, the organization of his thought along historical and realistic lines offers one of his clearest claims to significance. In a period marked, especially in Germany, by speculative metaphysics carried to extreme lengths, he had the courage to turn aside from romantic and rationalistic tendencies and to develop a view of the world based upon reliance on empirical facts, on common sense broadly interpreted, and on the accumulation of scientific and historical evidence. Geijer was no doubt predisposed to seek a historical foundation for philosophy by his professional position in history and his wide experience in historical research. He was, after all, "an historian with the same standing in his country's literature as Macauley, Michelet and Ranke in theirs".² The impulse also came from his desire to maintain a position as close to realism as possible. His mind was characterized by a strong sense for facts, by a deep respect for science and by an insistent demand for an empirical explanation of natural phenomena.

It is hardly too much to say that throughout his writings the struggle for human freedom is Geijer's central theme. Yet it is never a merely abstract freedom which he sees marching through history, never an impersonal corporate freedom, like Hegel's, unfolding in the temporal process, but always the concrete personal liberties of specific individuals or groups faced with pressing problems demanding both immediate and enduring solution. Geijer himself described his views as a "philosophy of personality"; and it is as the "founder of the Swedish philosophy of personality"³ (often said to be Sweden's most distinctive con-

1. The work of Eric Gustaf Geijer embodies as does that of few other men the movement of ideas which shaped the intellectual growth of Modern Sweden. He developed his philosophy of personality in his lectures on the Philosophy of History and in many ways. He lived from 1783 to 1847 yet his views hold a modern interest. He was prominent as a member of the Riksdag, a professor at Uppsala, active in advancing national education, director of the studies of Crown Prince Oscar, member of the opposition to the Throne compelling the King to adopt liberal administrative reforms.

2. Blanck, Anton, Introduction to *Minnen*, page 31.

tribution to philosophic thought), that he is remembered today in Swedish philosophic circles. It is therefore within personal freedom that one looks to find the root of his position. Although in his philosophy of history Geijer is more concerned with working out its application to politics, morality and religion than with its sources in individual consciousness, nevertheless a man is free, in his eyes, only to the extent that he respects the freedom of others; and this personal freedom consists, not only in liberation from restraints (so-called negative freedom) and in the positive growth of self-expression, the unimpeded development of man's powers, but especially in the awakening of the moral consciousness which draws from within a source of guidance and imposes discipline upon itself.

In Geijer's philosophy the freedom of the individual is linked with its organized expression in the community, with the moral freedom of conscience, with God as the ground of unity underlying all free personalities, and with history as its successful revelation in time. Through conscience, which is present in everyone and which, in Geijer's opinion, must be accepted as the voice of God, the meaning of life is revealed to men, not "once for all" but progressively; enabling them to catch glimpses in all that is noble, worthy, free, enlightened, useful in their experience, of a higher purpose in the world. Though science deals with physical facts in terms of laws and classes neutral in value, it is impossible, in Geijer's view, for men to regard goodness, harmony and enlightenment in this impersonal way. For these latter always arise *in connection with the activities of persons*; and since it is in these unique qualitative achievements that what is most significant in life occurs, men must regard these widespread facts as evidence of the presence of personality and purpose as basic in the universe.

Looking through the moral sense to the growth of a wider community, to the development of an ideal state, man becomes aware of a higher being, believes Geijer; a supreme personality,

3. Sweden: *Historical and Statistical Handbook*. Edited by J. Guinchard, by order of the Swedish government. Stockholm, 2nd edition, 1914, volume 1, pages 328-329.

God, through whom the meaning of the cosmic process is revealed as a search for harmony in the progressive emancipation of free subjects, and history is disclosed as manifesting this liberation as its inherent goal.

To Geijer's mind, historical evidence points to an unbroken process. Events are somehow connected; and the closely related way in which later stages and changes follow from the earlier shows that there are no isolated events. Accordingly, things can only be understood in their relation to each other; the later in the light of their predecessors, each in relation to its context. The activity of intelligence is required to grasp the necessity of this constructive principle in nature. The significance of this continuity cannot be "realized" through sense perception alone, but judgment is required for the task. Without critical analysis, imbued with the spirit of true scientific progress, no advance, indeed no recognition of an "upward trend" in events, is possible. The inquirer must be able by adopting a selective method of reviewing empirical data, to distinguish fact from fancy, truth from mere appearance suggested by individual differences of perception, the practically important from the inconsequential details in any general scheme. The function of intelligence, to Geijer, is always to discern what is practical and promises useful results.

For an opinion may pride itself on its consequences in theory as much as it pleases, but it is limited nevertheless always by the extent to which it is practical.⁴

Geijer is convinced of the presence of a constructive evolution, a natural purposiveness discernible in nature. To substantiate this contention he points to examples from botany and other sciences to show that the more complex comes everywhere from the simpler, and involves an improvement thereon. It follows, to his mind, that every branch of knowledge, including philosophy, must seek to grasp the working of this evolutionary process and to discern the stages of its development. Indeed, the sense of this purposiveness, the effort to understand it and even to further it is

4. Geijer, E. G., *Menniskans Historia*, page 65.

what lends vitality to every field of thought; for knowledge, to be fruitful, must have some concrete goal in its activities; its purpose must show itself to be constructive in the long run; it must contribute to the advancement of life.

So much is sure, that only what is experienced, witnessed, knowledge that is lived through, has value; all other is mere verbiage.⁵

Like living nature, knowledge can only be tested through the medium of practicality. A theory which cannot be given practical demonstration remains merely a dream, since in the last analysis "all knowledge is knowledge of reality." Since this reality involves an evolutionary process, thought divorced from the attempt to grasp and promote the realization of this inherent purposiveness remains barren and unreal.

History, (says Geijer), abstracted from its vital principle, or the idea of development becomes merely a motion-less thing; it dissolves into bare description and disintegrates into a mere register. The field of so-called natural history has to a great extent been in danger of this, until the more modern idea of evolution gradually penetrated it in a highly interesting fashion, similar to the manner in which the evolutionary hypothesis has come to pervade the fields of geology, biology, geography and physiology as well as comparative anatomy (the last, through the experiments of Cuvier, Blumenbach and others). If the idea of natural history had not been a living force to the genius of Linnaeus, would not his division of nature into species, classes, *etc.* have been without connection or actuality? What are such classifications if not stages in a development? At least, this is the regulative idea which must always be in the mind of the student of nature, yet he should protest against any superficial solution which ignores the problem.⁶

As in natural history or biology so in all knowledge fruitfulness turns upon the comprehension of phenomena as stages with-

5. Geijer, *Samlade Skrifter*, ser. 1, vol. 5, footnote on page 25.

6. Geijer, E. G., *Samlade Skrifter*, ser. 1, vol. 5; page 350.

in a developmental process. The discovery of related species and types suggests to Geijer's thought the presence of an intelligible, teleological ordering in the world akin to the activity of mind. Just as the mind in understanding phenomena explains the concrete fact by revealing its implications as an exemplification of a general concept or law, so the development of the plant or animal seems to consist in the explication of what was implicit in the species by realizing the original potentialities of the germ. In Geijer's words . . .

In every explanation of natural phenomena by the understanding, it seems that its own (characteristic) function, namely judgment, which works within certain boundaries according to law, is held to be the inner quality of all actual phenomena. So, for example, the entire plant lies implicitly in the seed, which produces its own kind, and therefore is immanent: that is to say, it is the embodiment of the concept itself.⁷

Yet though, in the plant and animal kingdom, the development of each creature is essentially a repetition of the type, it is seen that as we go higher in the evolutionary scale, animals show increasing traces of spontaneity, independence and individuality. In man this tendency to develop an unique individuality, in which the common character of the species no longer predominates, is fully achieved through the growth of conscious intelligence. Here at length the development movement comes to comprehension of itself, the root of the creative process comes to light within the creature's consciousness, and the individual, in attaining conscious direction toward ends hitherto realized only unconsciously, achieves *freedom*. Geijer goes on to assert that . . .

Further analysis shows that the relation between a race and an individual continues constantly to develop. Therefore, the plant is more a 'species' than an 'individual'; whereas, in the animal world, the individual is more independent in its existence. The eminent physician Boerhaave in Holland, who was Linnaeus'

7. Geijer, E. G., *Menniskans Historia*, page 123.

teacher, said that an animal carries its roots with it. It is detached from the soil, has spontaneity in itself and carries its nutritional process within itself; in contrast with the plant, which is fastened to the ground. . . . What is said of the animal, that it carries its roots within itself, applies absolutely to man also; he is an *absoluta individuum* because here the understanding has developed. Therefore, life or lawful order is not unconscious of itself but comprehends itself in its own origin, and is in that way its own product. Although the animal does not get any further than the condition of spontaneity, man attains the condition of freedom; that is to say, the root of man's being comes to light.⁸

Geijer expresses rather frequently the view that there is a fundamental unity in history. He tries to discern the truth in historic material which at first sight may seem obscure and even legendary, and endeavours with the aid of philosophic speculation, to find the underlying connections between different events and widely separated phases of a people's life, which to a less reflective historian would seem quite unrelated. In order to accomplish this, Geijer emphasizes that it is not sufficient merely to utilize the traditional methods of research. Although it is true that the historian must consult all relevant legal documents he can procure, as well as public declarations in speeches, governmental records, diaries of influential people (if only there is "not too flagrant a desire for scandal-mongering") and any other available source of information, nevertheless the record of these findings is not enough without the recognition that a modern outlook requires the realization that all histories belong together and are not complete without a conception of their relationship within the larger history of humanity. Historical research, in order to possess the deepest truth, must be provided with some conception of a world order and of the universal movement of mankind.

A function of philosophy is in Geijer's opinion to call men's

8. Geijer, E. G., *Menniskans Historia*, page 123.

attention to the comprehensive plan of sequence and to the evidence of advance in a definite direction revealed by natural events.

Because his concern with historical knowledge is not motivated simply by interest in the accumulation of facts, but is also directed to the light which they can throw on the resolution of future problems, Geijer is often referred to as "Sweden's 'first' or 'greatest', pragmatic historian".⁹

An illustration of the application of Geijer's philosophic realism to his historical research may be found in the treatment of early Swedish history in his great work "*The History of the Swedish People*". Here we see the importance of the genius, (either political or military), counterbalanced by the enduring influence of the "man of the soil" and also the bearing of the geographical and climactic factors in any historical process. Despite the stress which he lays on the influence exerted by men of genius upon the course of events, Geijer recognizes that history is a social process and that the masses of mankind also contribute to the broad tendencies of social development. Permanent effects in the life of nations, he feels, depend on the strength of those who live close to the soil. Through the slow rise of the peasant, the backbone of peoples, the world moves forward. Only against the strong, enduring background of their life is the feverish game of capitals and courts seen in true perspective. Here are the silent organic roots in the history of nations; world conquerors, like Napoleon, may quickly disappear; but here is the quiet unmarked achievement that "outlasts time". Writing of the *Odalbonde* (the Swedish peasant) he says, in a poem pregnant with his philosophy of history,

great things come about quietly. The lightning flash
and raging storm soon leave no trace.¹⁰

9. Svanstrom, Ragnar and Palmstjerna, *Short History of Sweden*, (translated by J. Bulmar), Oxford 1934; page 425.

Carl and Schuck, *History of Sweden*, Stockholm, 1929, page 433.

10. Geijer, E. G., *Samlade Skrifter*, ser. 1, volume 3, from the poem *Odalbonden*, written in 1811:

Vad stort sker, det sker tyst.
Snart marks ej spar av stormens gang
Av blixten, sen den lyst.

History, in his opinion, reveals a continuity of development, in which clues as to the later growth of peoples are often to be found through study of their early tendencies in political organization, religion and art; as well as in the ownership of property, modes of livelihood, family institutions, natural resources and geographic position. In Sweden Geijer saw a country which had enjoyed a continuous independent development since the dawn of her history; a country which racially as well as politically had been intact for over twelve hundred years.

It can easily be seen that, unlike other nations of Europe, the situation of Scandinavia had been unique. Sweden in particular had remained untouched by the influence of Rome and the heritage of classical civilization, until nearly a thousand years A.D. In the ancient history of these Northmen, their communal ways of life, their religion, poems and mythology — if one could critically sift the truth from the cloud of legend — Geijer caught glimpses of a distinct culture which had developed autonomously, utilizing its own spiritual and physical resources from prehistoric times. In attempting to recapture the life of these early northmen, Geijer felt that there was much in the institutions they had forged which might have a wider significance for the world. Hence he studied indefatigably their traditions, myths and folklore, as well as the oldest records, for light upon these times. In their immemorial custom of electing their kings, in their assemblies, in the ancient laws which guarded their liberties, in their placement of property under the protection of the kindred, in the strong influence which the yeoman exercised in this loose federative system, Geijer saw fruitful tendencies for later days.

The most fruitful path for philosophy is to be found, in Geijer's opinion, through comprehension of the moral experiences of daily life. Morality is rooted in conscience, while conscience essentially involves the experience of freedom. Here Geijer recurs once more to the notion of freedom, which has served throughout as the key to his interpretation of history and personality. The consciousness of freedom, which arises in the

experience of each human being, finds its full expression only in the moral life. In the growth of the individual, conscience is the liberating force which transforms the natural creature into an autonomous personality. "An abstract, negative freedom," says Geijer, "can accomplish nothing, if man does not make it to be of consequence *as his own law*." But to comprehend this freedom, man must turn aside from the theoretical constructions of the understanding to a consideration of experience and his practical life. "Man's real law is," Geijer declares, "no other than the moral (law), present in conscience, through which also the intelligence first comes to exist for itself." But in asserting his autonomy as a morally responsible being, subject to the law of his own conscience, man is led to the idea of God. Through the notion of freedom, he becomes aware of a creative source of freedom, which acts as the ground and safeguard of moral subjects in the world; and since freedom is essentially the expression of personality, this supreme freedom must have its source in a supreme personality at the basis of things. "Freedom," says Geijer, "is the first religious idea, which leads to the second, God, as its source." Thus through freedom, in Geijer's opinion, religion and philosophy (which centers in the idea of free personality) are brought into harmonious reconciliation.

In substituting the conception of personality for the traditional conception of the self or ego common to the thought of his time, Geijer strikes a new note in philosophy. In our day, it is interesting to observe, we are witnessing a similar shift in psychology in the increasing neglect of the notion of the "self", in favor of the development of the new "psychologies of personality." Although Geijer's usage of the term is philosophical, his choice of "personality" is similarly meant to emphasize the essentially social and developmental character of the self, — the fact that only in relation to another does a psychic center reveal its own nature. Moreover, in breaking with the Cartesian tradition, and refusing to find the root of one's being in the "I think, therefore I am", Geijer wished to affirm a wider *experiential* basis of

our nature than is to be found in mere individual cognition. Though the notion of personality, as he admits, is difficult to define, it seems broad enough to include imagination, feeling, will, action, as well as cognition within its comprehension; but especially its meaning permits the recognition of social factors as major determinants of character. Contact with others, the communion of subject with subject, the influence of society, and the reciprocal interchange and incorporation of new experiences in terms of one's own, seem to Geijer among the most essential features of personality.

When in philosophy we seek to understand personality, we find that the very heart of its nature lies in its being at once a unity and a multiplicity, an identity and a duality. It is the *same* self yet with multiple moods and diversities, a unity often divided in the duality of social *relations*. Starting with the ego, the abstract understanding is balked by the old problem of the irreconcilability of the "one" and the "many"; and hence it is that many philosophers have remained imprisoned in an abstract monism from which they could find no escape. Out of the pure identity of the ego they have sought to "create" or posit the non-ego, to produce the worlds of nature and society from the notion of a pure undifferentiated subject. Naturally they have failed to accomplish the impossible. If they had troubled to consult *experience*, they might have seen that the consciousness of self always involves the consciousness of another self; for the nature of intelligence is to seek itself in another,—and in another which is not a mere brute object but a subject capable of yielding communion and harmony. The fact is that consciousness is at once individual and social. As Geijer puts it:

What the intelligence seeks is itself in another, or another of the same species and dignity as itself, so that the impulse toward unity is not satisfied until the object becomes equal in dignity with the seeking self, a free object, *i.e.*, a subject, in which the personality principle is stated in the strongest terms.¹¹

11. Geijer, E. G., *Forelasningar Over Menniskans Historia*, Lecture 4,; page 209.

Thus the consciousness of self, the perception of personality or self-determination is never that of a solitary ego in lonely contemplation, but rather the meeting of one intelligence with another and by the kindling of mutual excitation each is roused to consciousness of its own individuality.

For the opposite of an "I" is not merely a "not-I" but "another-I". This is taught by experience: an isolated self cannot be found; but consciousness of self is realized only by placing it in opposition *not to itself*, but to another subject. If you leave the most gifted being by himself, he will not raise himself above the animal. An isolated personality is therefore impossible; personality can be developed only through contact with other personalities. Just as it is necessary to presuppose identity, without which it would not be . . . so it is necessary to recognize a radical duality in the conception of personality.¹²

This social duality, according to Geijer, runs through the different aspects of personality. Intelligence, for instance, does not "play a solo" but the growth of knowledge is possible only through a "harmony of intelligences". Indeed in sharing the community of knowledge, many minds, despite their differences, become as one mind. "They feel themselves as knowing only because of one and the same knowing", with the result that knowledge is essentially a social growth. The case is similar in willing, which is in some ways more fundamental to personality than intelligence.

Just as the original antithesis for consciousness is not between "I" and a "not-I", so in respect of will, its opposite is not "lack of will" (the will-lessness of inanimate things): for will is a power reflected into itself, which is possible only when it meets *another will*. Personality therefore is not found without an opposite of the same kind; every doctrine which makes nature the opposite of intelligence pulls down intelligence to the level of nature.¹³

12. *Ibid.* page 55.

13. Geijer, E. G., *Föreläsningar Över Menniskans Historia*, Lecture 4, volume 2; page 210.

Because mind or spirit is for Geijer essentially a member of a higher realm of ends, capable of ruling nature rather than contending with it as a partner on equal terms, he cannot, as this last remark shows, accept any doctrine which puts mind and nature in the universe in the same way (arising as correlatives of each other). Will takes its rise not through opposition to nature but through the excitation of another will; and men "feel themselves as willing only through a common will". . . "This relationship, reciprocal and clear", he adds, "between one will and another is just that knowing which expresses itself in *conscience*." Thus conscience is a kind of practical "knowing" rooted in volition which centers in the recognition of the universe as a community of wills, in which each plays his part by admitting the existence of reciprocal rights and duties among persons. This basic social union manifested in experience between mind and mind, will and will, is something which, in Geijer's opinion, must be affirmed as an initial datum and point of departure by every sound philosophy. The reality of this community of intelligences and wills, everywhere apparent in thought and action, must be both acknowledged as a fact and accepted as a presupposition. On its acceptance rests the possibility of all communication, all conscious cooperative enterprise, the exchange of knowledge, the practical give-and-take of daily life.

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DANTE'S AESTHETICS

By GUSTAV E. MUELLER

DANTE'S *Divina Commedia* admittedly is a great work of art, but were its manuscript discovered today, it is highly improbable that it would find commercial publishers, translators, and a "market". His majesty, The Average Reader, invariably begins to yawn after the first few pages, and when he thumbs through to see whether the *Paradise* is more palatable than *Hell*, he finds it less so. In despair he concludes that Dante has ruined his poetic talent by an outworn medieval metaphysics, and he will not waste his time to pick some roses from such a thorny bush.

In this attitude he is supported by his philosophers. Benedetto Croce is one of them. Most fashionable thinker around 1900, Croce has written an *Aesthetics* which reduces beauty to its most superficial aspect, sensuous immediacy; an aesthetics which is in accord with the impressionistic dissolution of music and art and literature of the time; and he also has written a book on Dante,¹ in which this impressionistic aesthetics is applied to the Divine Comedy; in reality this attempt is a *reductio ad absurdum* of sensualism in aesthetics.

Croce states that he wants to make Dante easy. He advises the reader to discard the whole structure of the poem, to drop all meaning; please just keep to the enjoyable sensuous images and to the music of the verse! Dante is to be read as if he were a Debussy. Croce fears that someone might take Dante's super-empirical world too seriously, and would not that be too uncomfortable! This is a nice piece of unconscious self-irony: How many works of naturalistic fiction are so uncomfortably convincing, that philosophers should write books to warn readers against taking them too seriously.

1. Benedetto Croce: *La Poesia di Dante*, Bari, 1921.

Croce rightly criticises nineteenth century empiricism for hunting up "influences" and for establishing historical details about the half-thousand figures that inhabit Dante's world. True, those "fact-finders" do not "explain" Dante, but at least there is still some human interest and human significance in their green pastures of facts, while Croce's "enjoyment" is completely devoid of even the last trace of human significance. It is the same difference in aesthetics as in logic between the stuffy scientism of the Spencers and Wilhelm Wundts, and the absolute void of the "logical positivism" of the early twentieth century, which is just as empiristic as the older positivism, but is reduced to the husks of formal and fictionalistic "methods".

*Non ragionam di lor, ma guarda e passa?*¹ (Let us not heed them, but watch and pass on.)

1. Inf. III. 51.

Volgare.

Instead of taking the negative way in demonstrating why sensualism in aesthetics must necessarily fail to account for great art and why it can, at best, only account for superficial and decadent art, we rather take the positive way of Dante's own aesthetics, and we begin with his consideration of language.

Why did he choose to write in Italian and not in Latin? He says that Latin is the nobler language, better fitted to express an enduring work in enduring form, while the *volgare*, the common parlance is, on the contrary, subject to localities and changing fashions. But the poet prefers his native tongue because he wants his song to reach every individual, not only the learned ones. His work is written in clear language, simple comparisons. It is intended to be a "popular" work. Dante wants to reach every individual, because "every man is a philosopher according to the natural love which generates a desire for knowledge in each individual"—this is the scholastic conception of the popular, hence our quotation marks around that term. And "because without familiarity of conversation men do not trust and hence do not

know each other"; here language is the vehicle of expressing a profound community through a common faith, which is the basis of knowledge. Thirdly, his song is a love song, it is not only addressed to men but also to women, who do not know Latin; and finally, the native tongue is organic, integrated with the soil and with experience, and therefore untranslatable.¹

And yet, while he wants to write a natural, an unaffected, a simple language for every man and woman, he knows that he will have few readers. This is liberality: To give good things without being asked for them.

The learned men will not take them, because they are not written in Latin, a privileged guild does not know the meaning of true liberality. "And of those who know Latin we shall find one in a thousand who would have been reasonably served by it. And to the shame of them I say that they ought not to be called learned men, because they do not acquire knowledge for the value of it, but forasmuch as they gain money and dignity thereby."² And "one ought not to call him a philosopher who is a friend of wisdom for the sake of profit, such as are the lawyers, doctors, and almost all religious men, who do not study for the sake of knowledge, but to acquire money and dignity."³

Dante is not a sentimentalist, however; if the professional and privileged classes are corrupt, the common people are worse: "popular opinion, deprived of reason, following the senses, swayed by passions and prejudices" is evil.⁴

And so he writes *volgare*: inviting each and all in a "full and loving liberality, but expecting only a few guests at the feast of love:

My song, I do believe there will be few
Who toil to understand thy reasoning . . . let them rejoice
Who find at least a music in my voice.

Mondo senza Gente. (World without People)

2. *Conv.* I. 5.

1. *ib.* I. 7. 2. *ib.* I. 8.

3. *ib.* I. 9. 4. *ib.* III. II.

5. *ib.* IV. 7. 6. *ib.* II.

To understand Dante's art is to understand the soul of all great art: imagination. His empire of imagination is inhabited not by people, but by shadows and monsters, mythical and invented images. Within this universe of imagination only the living poet is empirically real. And in each step you feel the faltering insufficiency of this empirical flesh and blood, confronted with the immensity of the universe opened through these images. You feel and see with Dante, you follow him in his actions/reactions, you see him in raptures and in swoons, with him you get practically involved, you repeat in turn what Dante experiences with his own guide; and in all this you must realize that the world as disclosed by imagination is the real world compared with the fatigued, flimsy, and short-spanned experiences of empirical creatures.

Dante thus liberates imagination as no other poet has dared. He knows the secret of the artistic word to conjure up a world living in and out of its own meaning. Imagination has an ontological dignity: it stands for the eternal world of being. This is the truth of imagination, and even our most empirical and "realistic" novel-fiction still lives, however much parasitically, from this truth. Even the most imitative fiction meandering along in empirical time, can not bring people literally and bodily into your home; they are imaginary, as the images of Dante are imaginary, only they are less so. Their imaginative density is thinner, because they are imitative and have not quite become themselves. They depend too much on the momentary and contingent excitements of the day. Dante, having consciously discovered this ontological dignity and freedom of the imagination, is therefore also free to develop that freedom to its fullest extent, to the highest range and to the broadest use.

Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise contemplate one and the same universe and its many value-dimensions, ordered in levels or degrees of understanding, moving from the peripheral, external, empiristic level to the central, religious, metaphysical level. And

within each of these levels of understanding reality, there is the same three-dimensional structure of poetic width, depth, and height.

In width Dante is not only an Italian, but he is an Occidental-European poet. The intuitive or expressive qualities of the lands from the Thames to Africa appear: you see the quiet green of the canal cities of Flanders, you lose your way in the sudden dense fog on Alpine passes, where the sun appears like a dim disk, and you see the organic landscapes of Italy and the burning sands of the Sahara. The beauty of nature is felt in forests and plains, in deserts and on beaches, in tempests and idyllic meadows.

In depth you are the spectator of all time. You feel the richness of tradition, wherein all trusting culture is rooted. The beautiful style, we are told, is never a matter of immediacy. Art is not at its best, when it works itself out of immediate raw materials, but art is kindled by art, one torch-bearer lights the torch of his successor over centuries. The secret of the great style in art is "*lungo studio e il grande amore*,"¹ "intense study and great love" for other masters of great art. Only out of this tradition, out of the wrestling with masters can real originality result, while empiristic immediacy can produce nothing but freakishness.

In height, hell, purgatory and paradise show the same dimensions and have the same range of the eternal-human world of values. All three perspectives treat of the same values that move the human heart—but hell means that they are only peripherally and behavioristically experienced, in purgatory they are understood as limited, while in heaven they are justified as universal principles, necessary for the constitution of this one and only real universe.

Hell is life "when it is deprived of the good of the intellect". Finite interests take themselves as seriously as if they were abso-

1. *Inf.* I. 83.

lute. And so they embrace an impossibility and a lie, because no finite interest is absolute. There is no movement in hell, only violent action. Hell is opaque and noisy, all senses are physical, reduced to immediate sensations. Their shapes are monstrous, grotesque, gigantic, measureless. And as we move deeper and deeper into this sphere of pragmatisms, positivisms, empiricisms, behaviorisms, from the naive natural light of reason into those metaphysical denials of metaphysical truth, the sense of depression and oppression grows suffocatingly.

Purgatory is this same life, but understood now as transitional, as limited, as moving towards a believed goal. There are horizons now. The senses are instructed and the physical senses recede. Ear and eye are enformed and informed by the meaningful images of art. Music and art accompany the pilgrims. There is movement, isolation is overcome. Voices, testify to the unity and solidarity of life in a common task of self-improvement and self-criticism.

Paradise is this same life again, differentiated in the same values and functions, but one in the absolute being, immanent in all, transcendent to any one of them. Even negation, the view that creates and is hell, is now understood in its justification as a necessary aspect of the whole of life. People in paradise are neither fixed in their own fixed ideas as they are in hell, nor do they move as they do in purgatory, but they are being moved and at the same time occupy their stations in life gladly. Sounding figures of light, collective symbols of universal values, timeless principles surround the contemplator of heaven, all images created of voices and light.

Literal Sense

The three ontological levels of the same living universe are, as we have seen, presented by the same three-dimensional structure of poetic imagination. Each level, therefore, offers the same difficulty of interpretation. Dante gives us, in his aesthetic reflections, the key to this interpretation. He distinguishes four levels

of it. These four levels were originally developed by the Neoplatonists and by the Greek church fathers, particularly Origen. Dante probably learned them from his much revered Bonaventura, Franciscan mystic thinker of the 13th century.

The first and lowest level of interpreting imagination is the "literal meaning". It "does not extend beyond the text itself".¹ The literal sense of the *Divina Commedia* "is the state of souls after death, considered simply as a fact".² "Literally Beatrice lives in heaven with the angels and on earth in my soul".³

The literal sense, then, is not merely the immediate sensuous image. *The whole of Croce's aesthetics is only one half of Dante's lowest level.* If sensations as such are isolated, they are rendered entirely external and so dead and meaningless. They mean something only if they are used to express the soul that appears through them. Only then can I react to them and understand their message:

"As the sensitive part of the soul has its eyes, with which it learns the difference of things, inasmuch as they are coloured externally, so the rational part of the soul has its eyes with which it learns the difference of things inasmuch as each is ordained to some end, and this is discretion."⁴

In ordinary perception this expressive quality of perceptions as messengers of the purposive life is confused and weak, in art it is made to appear and to shine clearly. To understand the image in art, we must understand first the purposive functionality of life embodied therein. Virgil tells Dante that he must understand life as purposive activity, if he wants to understand what he will physically see on his journey.⁵ Speech particularly is a meaningless and not even musical sound, if the emotion, feeling and thought expressed by external sound is not clearly communicated.⁶ The energy and lucidity of Dante's great and simple images is due to the clarity, with which the poet has grasped the

1. *Conv.* II. 2. Letter to Can Grande Della Scala.

3. *Conv.* II. 2. 4. *ib.* I. II.

5. *Inf.* XI. 20. 6. *Conv.* I. 2.

aesthetics of this "literal meaning". When he praises art in the Purgatory he points out the functional and expressive quality of appearances in art. There is always a correspondence of image and function in Dante. Every sin finds its own expression and gesture. Its appearance expresses its own desire, and so every soul is its own hell, purgatory, and heaven. This has been pointed out so often that we need not go into details.

Allegory.

The second level of interpretation Dante calls allegorical. He defines it paradoxically as "a truth concealed under a beautiful untruth".¹

The allegorical meaning is none other than the universality of a poetic image. The image is emancipated from the narrow context of given events, it is taken out of definite places and definite times, and so it dies for the natural man with his five senses and is resurrected in poetic reality.

Orpheus tames wild beasts with his music. We can understand it first literally, as a story. But this Orpheus is not one individual who can be empirically located in a definite place or time, and these wild beasts are more than ordinary wild beasts, and this music is more than sounds audible to the physical ear. We feel that wisdom may at all times, in all places, for all people cultivate and educate cruel hearts.

This universal meaning is not directly, explicitly contained in the image. Taken literally such images would even prevent our allegorical understanding of them. It can be had only through negation of the obvious presence of the literal meaning. Therefore allegory is a truth concealed under what in its light now appears as beautiful untruth. The poet has the task of revealing universal human nature through the particular imagination of the literal story; and only when he is filled with this Platonic love of the universality of human "nature" has he a right and a mission to pass beyond the literal phase of imagination. "When it is *caritas* that causes a man to pass beyond (empir-

1. *Conv.* II. 1.

ical) truth, he speaks not against conscience".²

Universal values of life are fundamental for all human existence. But when the poet expresses them through images, he has to express them through a medium which is not adequate. In order to make it a convincing vehicle, it must be so saturated with intensity of feeling for the value or ideal involved, that it becomes transparent:

*O imaginativa, che ne rube
Tal volta si di fuor, ch'uom non s'accorge
Perche d'intorno sunin mille tube,
Che muove te, se l'senso non ti porge?
Muoveti lume che nel ciel, s'informa
Per se, o per voler che giu lo scorge.*

(O thou imagination that doest steal us
So from without sometimes, that man perceives not,
Although around a thousand trumpets sounded,
Who moveth thee, if sense impel thee not?
Thee moves a light that in the heavens takes form
By self, or by a will that downward guides it.¹

If the literal meaning of imagination already frees man from the pressure of pragmatic animal perception, the allegorical meaning transforms universal values and ideas into vibrating symbols; and man responds with rapture of delight. And since universal meanings are the common ground making communication and communion possible, while images are had only individually, this level of imagination forms a timeless aesthetic community:

*"Amor che nella mente mi ragiona"
Comincio egli allor si dolcemente,
Che la dolcessa ancor dentro mi suona.
Lo mio maestro, ed io, e quella gente
Ch'eran con lui, parevan si contenti,
Com' a nessun toccasse altro mente.*

"Love that within my mind discourses with me",
Forthwith began he so melodiously,

². ib. I. 3.

¹. *Purgatorio* XVII. 13-18.

The melody within me still is sounding.
 My master and myself and all that people
 Which with him were, appeared as satisfied
 As if nought else might touch the mind of any.²

However, the insufficiency of the vehicle (its "untruth") is also the limit of the allegorical level. Its extasis is counterbalanced by irony. The poet knows that he can not force his vision on the reader. Will, and industry, and technique can, at best, make the literal meaning of the image evident, but not its universality. The poet must trust the Muse to help him out where he alone must necessarily fail.³ The artistic rapture engendered by the allegorical truth, may even obfuscate the third level of meaning: the "moral sense" of the poem. Thus in the scene just quoted, the gruff voice of the guardian of the Purgatory mountain breaks into the aesthetic gathering:

*Noi eravam tutti fissi ed attenti
 Alle sue note; ed ecco il vecchio onesto
 Gridando: "Che e cio, spiriti lenti?
 Qual negligenza, quale stare e questo?
 Correte al monte a spogliarvi lo scoglio
 Ch'esser non lascia a voi Dio manifesto.*
 (We all of us were motionless and attentive
 Unto his notes; and lo! the grave old man
 Exclaiming: what is this, ye laggard spirits?
 What negligence, what standing still is this?
 Run to the mountain to strip off the slough,
 That lets not God be manifest to you.)¹

Moral Sense

On the third level of interpretation the reader grasps the moral meaning of the work; "what readers should search for their own advantage".² Poetry exists only in relation to a reader, its objectivity is inseparable from subjective appropriation. The poet conveys his feeling of life, his evaluation of life, and his

2. ib. II. 112.

3. *Inferno* II. 7-12.

1. *Purg.* II. 116-123.

2. *Conv.* II. 1.

total world-view, and to this the reader responds, and in his response he can not fail to betray his own world-view and his own sense of values.

If he inhabits Hell he will reveal this fact by rejecting this moral implication of art; people in Dante's hell prefer to hide themselves in their tough pitch-lakes rather than to be seen by the visiting poets, and the devils themselves slam doors in their faces or, when they espy them, "knit their brows like old sailors looking at a needle's eye". But such denials that you yourself are subjectively, existentially addressed by art—*tua res agitur!*—does not destroy the truth. The denial only establishes life as sinister and blind for the denier.

People in purgatory, on the contrary, are glad to be recognized, they are seeking the poets' presence. A clear mirror of their weakness will be aiding them to overcome it.

In heaven the moral meaning of poetry is revealed to the poet:

Conscienza fusca
O della propria, o dell' altrui vergogna,
Pur sentira la tua parola brusca.
Ma nondimen, rimossa ogni mezogna,
Tutta la tua vision fa manifesta,
E lascia pur grattar dov' e la rogn.

(A conscience overcast
 Or with its own or with another's shame,
 Will taste forsooth the tartness of thy word.
 Nevertheless all falsehood laid aside,
 Make manifest thy vision utterly,
 And let them scratch wherever is they itch.)¹

Mystic Sense.

The moral sense of art is not its highest level, however. The "whole vision" contains the various moral values dissolving them in its totality "as in a mighty wind".² This total and all-embracing meaning of imagination Dante calls its mystical or anagogical

1. *Paradiso* XVII. 124-129.

2. *ib.* 122.

sense.³ Bonaventura applies this term to the reading of the universe as a picture book of the creator. Dante applies it to the work of art as actualizing this vision of the universe. And his aesthetics culminates in comprehending this artistic actualization in thought. Beauty is the world as spectacle condensed in art, penetrated by philosophy; this is the aesthetic trinity of philosophy as aesthetics.

The *Divina Commedia* is the aesthetic synthesis of man as the center of all his worlds. As such the human figure appears in the final vision of paradise: Man in the heart of the absolute Trinity.

The mystic or anagogical sense of the poem, then, is the primacy of contemplation over the moral and civic virtues of active-practical life.⁴

It is the unity or wholeness of the poem, in which all values of life coalesce like themes in a symphony.

It is the liberation of the soul achieving beatitude "freed from the trammels of circumstance".¹

It is the consolation emanating from the light of the super-empirical, reality shining in the poem when "the natural light of this day and hour is no more".²

It is the love of beauty wherein the "many become one" a synthesis "providing a glad life together".³

This love of beauty is the reflex of God's love, wherein nature and life are made lucid and transparent; Nature, "God's daughter" is a living creature as we are, and life is a cosmic community, and also what disrupts this community, the false absolutisation of given experiences, the empiristic negations of hell, are affirmed as necessary moments of the eternal process.⁴

This process is the dialectic of an infinity of individual differentiations and of individual movements in the unity and the

3. *Conv.* IV.

4. *ib.* I. 5.

1. *Conv.* II. 16.

2. *ib.* I. 13.

3. *ib.* I. 13.

4. *Inf.* III. 1-9.

peace of being; to this process all, whether they know it or not, contribute. It is symbolized in the form of the *terza rime*, ever renewed movement in rest. Such art is "the living mirror of the universe".⁵ Seen from this highest level of totality "all life is a movement to become beautiful",⁶ the formula of Platonic idealism.

Man, made in the image of God, exhibits this dialectical-ontological synthesis on all levels:

as concrete unity of perceptions and feelings, "the interweaving of shadows and facial expressions";⁷

as unity of characteristic empirical images and universal ideas; and as unity of passionate moral evaluations and encompassing aesthetic love.

"If you see what philosophy sees, but not in the medium of reason, then you behold a miracle".⁸

The *Divina Commedia* is such a miracle.

5. *Conv.* III. 7. 6. *Purg.* II. 75.
7. *Purg.* XII. 64. 8. *Conv.* III. 13.

RENAISSANCE BELLES-LETTRES

By WILLIAM VAN WYCK

THE chronology of the Renaissance is more the chronology of an influence than of a passing of time. Its various activities were not uniform in endurance, and some of these were ending, as others were continuing. The literary influence of the Renaissance lasted longer than its other influences, and the last great writer who wrote under this aegis was Goethe. The famous *Cinquecento*, or Italian High Renaissance does not refer to the sixteenth century only, and it is an abbreviation of *Mille Cinquecento*, or fifteen hundred. Chronologically speaking, this era contained the last half of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries, extending from the rule of Lorenzo the Magnificent to the death of Michelangelo.

The Renaissance influence was urban and one of its features was the accumulation of wealth by a capitalistic middle class. The Renaissance culture was a *bourgeois* culture, secular in character, lacking Mediaeval discipline, and with theological speculation thrust into the background. The Renaissance was a natural movement toward progress, an attainment of self-conscious freedom of the human spirit manifested in the western European races. Long before its arrival, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio and Italy had recovered the consciousness of the intellectual that had been Rome's. It was an aliveness to beauty, and, to a lesser extent, to nature. Beauty ceased to become a snare and a pleasure which had been regarded as a sin. Churchly mysticism was replaced by a culture in classical humanities, and reason was released from its dungeon by the discovery of an inner and an outer world. In the Renaissance, both the physical world and physical man were discovered.

There were three stages of scholarship during the Renaissance, to wit: (1) the age of passionate desire (Petrarch pouring

over Homer and Boccaccio learning Greek, in order to drink from the well-head of poetic inspiration), (2) the age of acquisition and of libraries (Pope Nicholas V's and Cosimo de' Medici's libraries, and Bracciolini ransacking cities and convents for manuscripts), and, (3) the age of invention and philosophy (the printing press, the compass and the telescope, and Erasmus). And in this revival of learning, Petrarch and Boccaccio were pioneers. The fathers of humanism, they brought much to it, and this humanism had both a broad and a narrow sense, starting from a concept of the independence of man, with classical literature a stage on which man played his part with complete moral freedom. And if Petrarch wrote his sonnets in the vernacular, his heart was with Latin which he considered to be the only literary language, other than Greek. He could not read Greek, but he admired extravagantly the Latin translations of the Greek secular writings. He had an individualistic point of view. Loving antiquity and finding his own era repellent, he possessed a true historic sense that was totally unknown to Mediaeval man. His treatment of the classics was modern, and he recognized the ancient world as ancient, a thing that Mediaeval man had never done, attempting to incorporate it with his own tradition. Petrarch helped to restore Horace, and he was interested in literature for its own sake. Also, he liked ruins, nature, and geography. He was a model for followers in the field of scholarship, and Italian humanism never lost the powerful impress of his genius.

Although secular Latin literature had been esteemed during the Middle Ages, this esteem was largely confined to the writings of Virgil, of Cicero, and of Caesar, and everything was flavored with Christianity, the Church insisting that she have a finger in every pie. Mediaeval art had exhausted its originality and painters, in attempting to depict other-worldly Marys, Christs, saints, etc., had succeeded in making these so unreal that they took unto themselves a certain *grotesquerie* which was rather

unlovely at times. Man's place in Heaven had been reiterated for so long, that man was becoming a little weary of it. In the fourteenth century the remains of Roman imperial glory were to be found throughout the entire Italian peninsula, Greek remains were to be found in Sicily and southern Italy, and the rulers of the Italian states vied with one another to increase their prestige by acting as patrons of scholars and artists. The popes accepted this fashion, and humanism spread through the land. Ancient manuscripts became a Renaissance mania and the monastic libraries were ransacked, so that by the end of the fifteenth century, the works of the most important Latin authors had been discovered.

Boccaccio sought the Pierian Spring, athirst for the waters that had refreshed and inspired the Greek writers of the Golden Age. And this study of the Greek and Latin classics had led to a closer scrutiny of ancient ruins and classic works of art. Thus the Humanists came to see a classic world in a truer historical perspective. As good as all of this was, it paled before the humanism of the individual, when the Renaissance placed its emphasis on the freedom and dignity of men as individuals. The Middle Ages did not recognize the individual, since authority was in the hands of the Church which was occupied with men's souls, rather than with men's minds and bodies. To the Church, man was merely a soul to be saved from the tortures of eternal damnation, and was forced to put himself in the hands of a priestly hierarchy, which told him what to do, and how to do it, forever jiggling Hell in front of his eyes to keep him as inhuman as possible, and as other-worldly. So it was natural that man was not a worldling.

But when the Italians discovered Greece and Rome, they discovered empires that had been highly individualistic. The Crusades had acquainted the knights and their followers with non-European lands, and a contact with Moslem culture had caused a fresh observation of nature and the rise of trade. Furthermore, it accustomed the Crusaders to a standard of luxury

completely unknown to a western European world. The knights were Christian barbarians and the Moslems were cultured pagans. Other-worldliness had robbed western European men of all but one thought, the means by which man might escape the danger of an eternal Hell. And the advice that the Church gave to her children, caused them to seek *douleur* rather than *joie de vivre*. The knights returned with a new concept of living that was excellent, and without which, there might not have been a *Renaissance*.

If a classical humanism was good, a human humanism was even better. Suddenly man found that in realizing that he had a mind, he could use it to discover that he had a body. So he began to express himself tempestuously, and he became a law unto himself, causing thereby some political confusion. With the emancipation of mind came an interest in many new things. Where Mediaeval man was commanded not to think, Renaissance man was forced to do so, regardless of whether he was right or wrong. All of the arts underwent a change and there were stirrings toward science and political theories. Marauding became respectable and many an impoverished soldier became a wealthy leader. From humble origin, men sprang into power, and among these may be mentioned the de Medici, the Sforza family and the d'Este family, and many another who won fame and fortune.

The High Renaissance was an *est* era, the best manners, the finest gentlemen, the ablest politicians, the genteelest courtiers, the smartest generals, and books showing how to become an *est* flooded the market. It was an era with which to reckon, and, the order of the day was beauty and more beauty, as would have been evidenced but yesterday, if one elected to stroll down a Florentine street, where all that met the eye was a joy to behold. And what was true of Florence, was true of other Italian cities. Popes began to vie with wealthy laymen to aid in the general embellishment and Rome profited particularly thereby. Michel-

angelo's *Saint Peter's*, Brunelleschi's *Dome*, Verocchio's *Coleone*, and Pisa's *Baptistry* — all of these are the results of one of the most beauty-loving and beauty-giving ages that the world has ever seen.

There were many other elements that helped to make the Italian High Renaissance, among which were, to wit: (1) the people's love of beauty, (2) the magnificence of the Italian countryside, (3) an equable and lush climatic and agricultural condition, and, (4) the Greek and Roman heritage. Nor must we overlook those men of the Petrarchan tradition who were active agents in spreading the new learning. Salutati advanced Latinity and influenced other scholars. Niccolo Niccoli stimulated the love of beauty and made generous public gifts. Bracciolini of the papal secretariat ransacked Europe for manuscripts and discovered a complete Quintillian. Chrysolaras taught Bruni and founded a group of Greek scholars in Italy. Pletho gave a new stimulus to Plato. Filelfo, the educator, helped to spread the new learning. And in the spreading of Greek throughout Europe, there were three important stages, to wit: (1) infancy under Chrysolaras, (2) adolescence under Filelfo, and, (3) maturity under Politian.

The great Platonic scholar was Ficino, whose translation of Plato's works endured until 1824. He was one of the great figures of the Florentine Academy. Then there were Valla who translated Thucydides and Herodotus, and Poggio who translated Xenophon and who dared to criticize the secular power of the pope, the Vulgate version of the *New Testament*, and the *Apostles' Creed*.

But the most significant event of the High Renaissance was the invention of printing, which started in Germany about 1450, but flowered in Italy. By 1500 there were thirty-eight printers in Rome. Milan introduced Greek type and by 1500, Venice had become the capital of the printing industry. The pioneer printers of Italy were Rhenish exiles, and the most important of the early

Italian printers was Aldus Manutius, a scholar who was in complete touch with the classical revival. By 1494 he had begun his *magnum opus*, the five volume edition of Aristotle. He set a high standard and employed an editorial staff of scholars and painters of fine repute, as well as a staff of compositors. He made his own ink, the famous Venetian Red, developed format, and experimented with the cursive, or running hand, as well as the italic and sloping Roman hands. He invented the small octavo, his first volume in this format being the edition of Virgil that appeared in 1501. By 1502 a number of these volumes had appeared, including one of Statius. His colophon was the famous dolphin and anchor, symbolizing speed and solidity. The classics of Aldus were standard until the nineteenth century.

As the revival of learning spread to northern Europe, it underwent certain changes, and differed as nationalities differed. It went from Italian warmth and color to French logic, Scotch and Swiss coolth, and from religious revolt in Germany to a literary zenith in one Englishman, William Shakespeare. That it was scholarly in the north was due to a Dutchman by the name of Desiderius Erasmus, the greatest scholar of his day, and one of the greatest scholars of all time. An active reformer, he often deserted his study to attack the false gods of the marketplace. He published a Greek version of the *New Testament*, accompanied by a new Latin translation of his own which exposed the many errors of the Latin version which the Church had stamped with her approval, and had incorporated with the official version of the *Bible*, dating back to the fifth century and regarded by conservative theologians as sacred.

The mundane side of Erasmus appeared in a book of satiric might, entitled: *Praise of Folly* (1509), in which he pointed out the evils of this world. He presented *Folly* as a woman in cap and bells, enumerating her many mundane triumphs. In the book, her merry discourse lashes the sordid customs of monks, the ignorance of schoolmen, the venality of the clergy, the ambi-

tions of kings, and the gross superstitions of the masses. The work is a biting exposure of the evils of the age, and Europe cheered it to the echo. To the Humanists, champions of the new outlook, the name of Erasmus became a battle-cry. So when Martin Luther went one step farther, flinging his challenge at the church directly, he (Luther) counted on the support of Erasmus. But in this he was doomed to disappointment, for, if at first he was regarded favorably, when he broke with the pope, Erasmus drew away from the movement in alarm, feeling that the only worthy and lasting reform would be the result of gradual enlightenment. But willy-nilly, Erasmus had laid the egg that Luther hatched.

Before departing from the High Renaissance, it might be well to mention a man who was as great a Humanist as any who has ever lived, a man who wrote a book which had as far-reaching consequences as any ever written, a man who revolutionized his profession to the benefit of all who followed him. This man was a Belgian physician by the name of Andreas Vesalius and his book, *De Fabrica Humani Corporis* (appearing in 1543) broke with the past and cast to the winds the Galenic tradition. Vesalius swept aside medical superstitions and put anatomy on so sound a basis, that from then on, physicians could work in the light. The Church had forbidden the dissection of the human cadaver and had forced physicians to rob the grave and the gallows-tree if they were to study anatomy. Galen had dissected dogs and pigs and many of his findings were erroneous. And when Vesalius undertook to ascertain the truth, he succeeded beyond his wildest hopes, and the consequence was the published findings of the *Fabrica*, a sweeping denunciation in Latin of Galenic and other superstitions.

Persecuted by the Church and jealous rivals, Vesalius found a martyr's death on the beach at Zante, when he was returning from an expiatory voyage from the Holy Land. Fortunately for the world, his monumental folio forced itself upon the minds of

thinking Renaissance physicians and the human body, like John Brown's soul, went marching on. Nor can the world ever repay Andreas Vesalius its debt of gratitude due him for giving it an entirely new school of anatomical thought.

The Renaissance saw Ghibelline triumph over Guelph and a schism that threatened the spiritual power of the Church by removing thousands of worshipers, a reform which brought about those decimating religious civil wars in France and the international religious struggles known as the 'Thirty Years' War which all but ruined Europe for decades. But in spite of this, the Renaissance made for so great a human progress, that it must be kept green and fresh in memory forever.

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

By PROFESSOR BARZIN

EVERY modern philosopher is so familiar with the distinction between truth, judgments and value-judgments that it is hardly necessary to define both notions. It is only essential to discard the word—misunderstandings, ever possible between philosophers. I propose therefore the following tentative definitions. A truth-judgment is always susceptible of being proved. Proof can be demonstrative or empirical; requirements as to what constitute a proof may vary with the developments of scientific methods, but a proof must always exist to guarantee truth-judgment. It is a *sine qua non* condition of judgments being true, that is of being a description of reality. Value-judgments do not describe reality, but express what ought to be, or, in some cases, what ought to remain in existence; in other words, value-judgments express a need, whatever be the nature of that need. It may be a desire of our aesthetical taste, a command of our moral conscience, a craving toward what is necessary to the maintenance of our life, or a mere liking. Thus, value-judgments are related to human action; they are plans or rules for future action.

Now, what are the relations between those kinds of judgments? In the legacy of the pragmatist philosophy, we find a short but decisive analysis of the facts which may bear upon that problem. In the first place, never can the value-judgments be derived from truth-judgments. In a final formula, the great French mathematician and philosopher, Henri Poincare, declared that that which ought to be could never be inferred from that which is. This hard condemnation of every kind of scientific ethics stands uncontrovertible.

From the other side, if there is one point of agreement between those who meditated upon scientific methods, that point is that our judgments can only acquire objectivity in avoiding every influence from these tendencies which express themselves

in our value-judgments. In other words, if a judgment has to be a truth-judgment, it must be radically independent of any value-judgment.

That mutual independence of truth- and value-judgments, if we keep it as expressed above, makes impossible any philosophy. Speaking in the most general way, a philosophy must provide us with a unitary outlook on the universe. Even if the philosopher admits that it is impossible to reconcile any part of reality in one unique formula, and consequently professes pluralism, he must teach us a harmonious system of attitudes, permitting every man to deal, without hesitation, with each of the parts of the universe. How would it be possible to achieve such a unity if truth and value-judgments remain radically separated? The realm of science and that of action would have no relation at all. That hidden reason for incompleteness or for inconsistency has been the stumbling block of many of the philosophies of the past.

II

Philosophy is thus impossible if the two kinds of judgments remain completely unrelated. This does not prevent us from acknowledging the facts referred to above: we shall not discover relations between both kinds of judgments. The only possible way is the reduction of one kind of judgment to the other, either, of the value-judgment to the truth-judgment, or contrarywise of the truth- to the value-judgment. Both ways are open, let us follow each of them.

Our actions are facts, parts of that immense pattern we call reality; their conditions must be facts too. We can thus try to discover certain facts, which will correspond to our value-judgments, and which will determine them. That study has been initiated for a long time. Without speaking of the extended but rather confused common knowledge, which predicts the reaction of an individual before such or such situations, two scientific disciplines have constituted methods to solve problems of that kind. The psychology of tendencies tries to discover the deter-

minant features of the physiological or mental state which produces, or tries to produce such or such action. Sociology, bringing up complementary methods, tries to outline social situations, which explains why the members of the community approve or blame certain given actions.

Here, in order to build our first philosophical attitude, we have to make an act of faith. Actual sciences present us only with scattered results, and not with a complete description of nature. We have to admit that they will be able to progress steadily, that they will never meet with a problem incapable of solution. In other words, we shall have to admit, that, even if there is much which is unknown, there is no unknowable. We will have then adopted what I shall name the positivistic attitude. This choice of appellation does neither imply nor deny that any of the philosophers whom we ordinarily label with that epithet, has ever realized that attitude of mind in its complete purity.

I wish to insist on only two features of that great vein of philosophy. Prepared to introduce scientific method in every kind of problem, provided that the problem be a "true" one and susceptible of solution, the positivist repels any reference to action. Every valuation is repelled by him in the most decisive manner; when somebody abandons himself to that delightful activity, he is out of the field of philosophy. Philosophers neither approve nor blame; their task is only to understand. They are even refused the joy to think, with Plato and Spinoza, that, with understanding, descend in human consciousness peace and wisdom. They enclose themselves in the pure and somewhat cold realm of pure ideas.

What becomes then of human action? Positivism does not think for a moment of denying its existence, but it denies that human action needs rules of conduct or edification. Their attitude being built around the idea of necessity, the Positivists believe that human life develops itself along paths it cannot quit. To think, as it was often done, that such a philosophy would lead

men to a discouraged fatalism, would be a simple misunderstanding. It does not deny that our efforts are useful, indispensable to our life, but Positivists refuse to admit our efforts in their philosophy except as manifestations of a scientific law.

I am not intending to disparage that attitude of mind, in which on the contrary, I feel a certain greatness, the greatness of contemplation for contemplation's sake, that of Archimedes going on with the solution of his geometrical problem, unheeding the Roman soldier brutally summoning him away. But as a source of philosophical literature, positivism is rather dry. Positivists can only repeat under various forms that we have to cling to science, and to nothing else. When they find something to do, as neo-positivists of our days found it in logistics, immediately that field becomes a new science requiring specialized scientists and not more professional philosophers.

The ideal type of the positivist philosopher is not a philosopher in the accepted meaning of that term, he has to be a scientist, not uniquely occupied with the technicalities of his own field, but with an intelligent curiosity toward the other scientific fields as well, and never turning his regard from the ideal of the unique and perfect Science as the goal of his efforts.

III

Let us now examine the other possible way of the necessary reduction of our two kinds of judgments, that is, the reduction of the truth-judgment to a value-judgment. This operation is commonly regarded as a characteristic feature of pragmatism. For the moment, I shall satisfy myself with denying that assimilation in the most categorical way, leaving the proof for later.

Thus, truth would be a value among others. Truth being a description of reality, reality has to be considered as a value also. The first consequence of that new position would be that science is no more a privileged activity, or as the positivists had it, the only philosophical attitude. Science is now a human activity, among other human activities. It has value, but there are other

things valuable too. The work of the philosopher, in that conception, takes on a new aspect. The philosopher must now experience the value of things, and try to discover an order between those values. It is only when such an order is achieved that human life may be harmonious. The philosopher thus plays a part in the community, a part which cannot be reduced to some other activity.

The first consequence of that position would be that philosophy may not be considered as a science. So long as you remain among instrumental values, that is among things which are only valuable as means to a certain end, confusion between philosophy and science is possible because relations of subordination between values may be reduced to causal relations between the things which bear those values. Causal relations between things is properly the field of science. When you come to independent values, there is no more help to be derived from science. They must be ranged in order by a kind of deeper reason, which springs from the philosopher's experience, or as we could say with the Pascalian word, "from his heart."

Philosophy will be more straightly related to action than to science. An order between values means a preference, and action is always conditioned by preferences. The difference between philosophy and action is one of degree rather than one of nature. In ordinary action, we solve a particular problem, and we are usually entirely absorbed in that problem. We forget everything else, until our action is completed. On the contrary, philosophy does not forget anything, or more exactly, tries not to forget anything. It is always led by the craving for totality. Unrest remains in the mind of the philosopher as long as he can think that certain values are not yet incorporated in the order which he builds.

That relation between action and philosophy gives to the latter a certain tinge of subjectivity. Preferences are always subjective, and most deep philosophical options will be admitted

to be mere preferences, but after all, philosophy never enjoyed objectivity. The spread of the doctrines of the greatest philosophers was always rather limited. The type of success which the most successful philosophical doctrines enjoyed was more similar to that of the works of art than to that of the productions of science. We often find whole epochs applauding the same beauty, as we find whole generations accepting the same philosophy. After that, mankind will desert these masterpieces or those doctrines, not because some defect was discovered in them, but because other masterpieces or doctrines, for obscure reasons, move them now more deeply. Scientific truth, on the contrary, is only abandoned when refuted.

If that conception of philosophy appears, at first view, rather strange, let me state my belief that every great philosophy of the past is of that type. My demonstration will be very short. None of those philosophers accept the reality of the common-sense or of science, but each brings up his own conception of reality. This implies evidently that reality is considered, unconsciously in most cases, as a value.

The aim of this paper was to bring precisely to consciousness that aspect of philosophy, which makes it a systematic valuation. I believe that it is not useless. The great danger for philosophy in our time is that it loses itself in too abstract technicalities. Conceived as a systematic valuation, it would come again in contact with life, with the problems which are born, not in the schools, but in our everyday efforts. Perhaps, then, it would take again what is its proper lot, the spiritual leading of mankind.

“HUMOR AT A TIME LIKE THIS”

By the late JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

A recent writer has produced a volume of upwards of five hundred pages entitled, *A Short Introduction to the History of Human Stupidity*. It might easily be lengthened into scores of volumes. But were it not more humane to take note of the vagrant flashes of wisdom and wit that flit across the morass of stupidity, like fireflies that transform a noisome swamp into a fairyland?

I

If one, seeking relief from the tragedies as well as the stupidities of our nervously over-wrought and spiritually underfed time, “and all our unhappy and o’erdarkened ways”, were to turn to the resources of *humor* as it breaks with perennial freshness through the tough sod of human experience, he would find himself nearer to the sources of sanity and a restored faith than he may have supposed. Such a pilgrimage in search of the fountains of humor might well begin with Plato who, at a time of political and social degeneracy and gloom not unlike our own, effected the union of philosophy and poetry, wisdom and humor, with an art as spontaneous as it was perfect and a spirit as hopeful as it was invincible.

How fresh and fair, as of the very morning of the mind, yet how mature in grace and wisdom, is the spirit with which the author of *The Republic*, *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus* and the other incomparable dialogues that hold converse with the spirit of universal man, sets out in company with friend Socrates upon his adventures with life and its perplexities, determined to find meaning even where he cannot solve mystery, persistently good-humored and undaunted! How blithely the ever-resourceful searcher after wisdom and lover of the same presents his startling and often revolutionary principles, comparing his astounding proposition

that philosophers are the only true statesmen to the *third wave* oversweeping the cautious and conventional minds of safe-by-the-shore swimmers, picturing arguments, strutting away from disputants to crow over unwon victories; conceiving of cicadas, daughters of the Muses, laughing at somnolent celebrants of the divine ardor of love¹; fitting old saws to new circumstances, and using apt analogies to illuminate obscure distinctions. How frank and winsome is his laughter at the presumptions of his own philosophic guild, likening the unabashed philosopher setting out, to the little tinker as he decks himself out to woo his employer's daughter, all unaware of his social inferiority; joining in the amusement aroused by his absent-minded fellow-philosophers as, engaged in star-gazing, they fall into wells to the amusement of Theban maids, or fumble at bed-making and other menial tasks essential to *corpus curare*. Yet how nobly he pays tribute to the philosopher's power to "hymn the true life aright" and to meet the large demands of ideal statesmanship! Here is humor in loyal and effective service to truth and right reason.

II

Next, one might pause a moment under the severe shadow of Medievalism, a somewhat somber place in which to look for humor, yet the capacity for it was by no means lacking among the finely equipped and virile minds of the Schoolmen and their predecessors, as is suggested by the familiar story of the reply of Duns Scotus Erigena (and in one hailing from either Scotland or Ireland; what else could be expected) to the Emperor Charles the Bold, when the latter, having invited the learned monk to dine, asked him: "What is the difference between Scot and sot?" to which the unabashed Celt cannily replied: *Mensa* (the breadth of the table between them). The Medieval mind can hardly be called hospitable to humor, yet both without and within the solemn grandeur of its cathedrals the subtle intruder found surreptitious place in grotesque gargoyle and carving, and into

1. Phaedrus.

the Miracle Plays stole the irreverent but welcome Jester, to lend a touch of the ludicrous to what might otherwise be too supernal for human nature to easily bear.

III

By common consent the two most distinct and pungent flavors of European humor are those springing from the dour soil of Scotland and the sweet greenery of Ireland. Whatever the affinities between them, racial and other, these familiar seasonings, so indispensable at the common table of cosmopolitan comradeship, are no more alike than are pepper and salt. Who would dare, however, to say which is which? Suffice to recognize that the Irish have acquired the almost exclusive right to that delightful form of nonsense termed "the Irish bull" — no one knows why, unless in happy contrast to the ponderosity of official papal utterances. Two happy Irishisms have of late fallen to my good fortune. One is that of the Irishman who exclaimed: "Be gorra I wisht I knew the place where I am goin' to die, and sure and I'd niver go there!" The other is a story of two Celts who went hunting together; startled by the flushing of a bird one exclaimed to the other (who had the gun), "Don't shoot, Mike, the gun ain't loaded!" to which Mike replied, "I've got to, Pat, the bird won't wait!"

Very different is the calculated deliberation of the Scottish mind in all of its reflective operations, even when excogitating humor. Yet what product, next to the songs of Robbie Burns — and theology — has Scotland contributed to the world's treasure-house of *cherishabilia* more characteristic than the surprising spendthrift wealth of stories which Scotsmen love to tell upon themselves celebrating their national virtue of thrift? One of the most succinct of these was given me by a distinguished Scottish philosopher as follows: A father and his bairn are walking side by side; the father, looking down inquiringly at his son's feet, asks: "Sandy, are those your new boots?" "Yes, Faither." "Tak' langer steps!" Yet Scotch humor is not confined to home eco-

nomics. Somewhat severe upon the medical profession is the humor lurking in the following reply of a farmer, living in a remote district, to the commiserating question: "But what do you do when someone in the family is taken seriously ill?" "Ah, weel, we juist hae to die a nat'el deith." Lovers of caninity will appreciate the story told of Dr. John Brown, author of *Rab and his Friends*, to the effect that once when driving through a street in Edinburgh the alert physician suddenly turned and looked back, and when his companion asked if he saw someone he knew, he replied: "No, I saw a dog I didn't know!" For the too fond lovers of ritual there is food for reflection in the reply of a sober Scotch mother to her clerical son, who, having invited her to witness the very elaborate ritual he had devised for his church service, asked her eagerly how she liked it, and received the somewhat compromising reply: "Verra fine, my Son. But isn't it rather strange doin's for the Sabbath day?"

IV

The singular notion of Americans that the English mind, in contrast to that of Scotland and Ireland, is greatly wanting in humor — strange, indeed, that this idea could arise in the mind of anyone who had read the plays of Shakespeare, to say nothing of "Alice in Wonderland"! — is illustrated by the familiar story of the American who exploded at the opacity of an Englishman thus: "I believe that if a joke were put into a gun and shot at your head you wouldn't get it"; to which the unabashed Britisher replied: "How *could* you shoot a joke from a gun?" That this reflects a certain type of Englishman may be true, but there are others — quite other.

There is undoubtedly a different color or *tempo* between the English and American types of humor. The *wag*, as such, e.g. seems to be an English institution, his American counterpart, the practical joker, being much cruder and less impressive. Some years ago I heard Sir George Adam Smith relate the two following feats of waggery: A wag walked into a shop for the sale of

milk in London and solemnly exclaimed to the man behind the counter: "I'll take a boy!" The astonishment of the shopkeeper was deepened at the further demand: "I'll take a girl!" The enigma was solved, however, when the bold, bad customer took the puzzled shopkeeper's arm, marched him out of the door and pointed to the sign over it, which read: "Families supplied in any amount." The other story was that of an alert, but somewhat sinister, profiteer upon human frailties who noticed that one of his fellow passengers in the train dropped his ticket.¹ Hastily picking it up he offered relief to the unfortunate man, hunting in vain through his pockets, by suggesting that he crawl under the seat for concealment. When the guard entered he was handed the lost ticket with the others, and looking around enquired: "Where is the other passenger?" At which the wag pointed to the boots protruding from under the seat, and remarked: "Oh, he prefers to ride under the seat!" But not all of English humor is of this type. Have we not recently had humor canonized in the person of Sir (now St.) Thomas More? When humor serves to disarm even the terrors of the executioner's block it becomes indeed saintly.

V

Whatever the degree of humidity in humor (the word itself for some unknown reason indicates its presence) that of Uncle Sam — at least in his role of the Yankee — is proverbial for its dryness. Why Yankee humor should be called *dry* is a study for the psychographer (being quite too subtle a problem for that over-confident analyzer of human conduct, the psychologist). Perhaps it is because it is so often unaccompanied by any apparent self-consciousness, or because it awakens a "reaction" — that most dull and unhumorous of all words — which resembles the crackling of thorns under a pot rather than "tears of laughter." At any rate Yankee humor is characteristic and unique in its implied

1. I have since heard this story related of Mark Twain and it now appears in the volume *Mark Twain: Wit and Wisdom*. Who will settle this dispute between Britain and her upstart daughter?

comment on life — and how to meet its many exigencies. This is well exemplified in the account that Rollin Lynde Hart gave some years ago of meeting an old farmer one morning in the Berkshires to whom he remarked: "It seems to me you folks around here never die." "Well," was the apt reply, "it's about the *last thing* we do." There is a characteristic Connecticut story which I once heard "Jo" Twitchell of Hartford (the late Rev. Dr. Joseph Twitchell), Mark Twain's friend, tell at a Forefathers' dinner — a story which may be used as a kind of intelligence test, or perhaps I should say, a test of Yankee intelligence, as follows: A Connecticut farmer drily recounted this unintentional adventure: "One day I hitched a pair of young steers to a stum-boat up in the north wood-lot and got on. Gosh! I hadn't gone *ten rods* 'fore I seed my mistake."

No story connected with that laconic and typical Yankee, Calvin Coolidge, quite equals that of his meeting a well-known senator on horseback in the Black Hills — a solon noted for his inveterate habit of taking and holding with granite obstinacy the opposite side on every issue. After passing the time of day, as they took their several ways, Coolidge remarked that he looked around at the senator and was surprised to see him "going the same way as the horse." This has the true Vermont flavor, well matched by the story of the old lady who wrote the implacable President asking if any of his "bureaus" of which she had heard were for sale; to which he replied that he was afraid that he had no bureaus to spare, but that he had a cabinet that he would be glad to dispose of at a very low price.

Walter Hard has garnered a number of Vermont gems-in-the-rough in his delightful books, *Salt of Vermont* and *A Mountain Township*. One of the best of these Yankee gleanings paints a village street down which a lover of horseflesh comes proudly driving a gallant steed after his own heart, when out steps the village cynic from the sidewalk, stops the complaisant horseman and caustically informs him that his horse "interferes." "Well,"

calls back the irate owner as he drives away, "I can tell you one thing. If she does interfere, she doesn't interfere with anyone except *herself*!"

Emerson took delight over the consternation of the German who came to Concord and at the livery stable ordered a sleigh, and when the stable-keeper asked whether he should put in a "buffalo" exclaimed: "No! for Heaven's sake put in a horse!" This will soon be an enigma to the American of the auto-era.

It would be unjust to refer to American humor without a tribute to that of the American negro. How much of it he may owe (as he does the greater part of his dialect) to association with the people of the South, is a question for the student of ethnology, but at all events he has developed a humor of his own which in its uniqueness, as well as in sheer good nature and geniality, has given him a secure place in the esteem and affection of all who appreciate the value of the kind of fun that cheers but not excoriates.

VI

With respect of French humor I will venture only to refer to the playful penetration of the humor of Provence exemplified in Daudet's charming sketches and tales, especially that of the inimitable *Tartarin of Tarascon*. Dr. John Watson (Ian Mac-laren) had among his American lectures one on "National Types of Humor" to which I once listened. The story he told illustrative of French humor ran as follows (it took some seconds for the audience to register its perception of the point): Two gentlemen were seated side by side in a coach traveling along a country road. One was very loquacious and tiresome and his comrade was suffering consequent torture when, at some distance ahead, a man was perceived sitting under a tree stretching himself and giving an enormous and prolonged yawn. "See!" said the bored to the borer, "we are already overheard!"

German humor is at present so much in abeyance as to lead one to wonder if Germany will ever recover the mirthfulness

which lights up the Marchen gathered by those two lovable brothers bearing the singularly paradoxical name of Grimm, a humor that reappears in Heine, animates the broad sanity of Luther, with his rough but good-humored laughter, and awakens immortal gaiety in the exquisite playfulness and elemental charm, as of the morning stars singing together, of the celestial spirit of Bach. German Philosophy may be forgiven its lack of humor because of its dead-in-earnestness, but a modicum of the light but judicious touch of William James would do it no harm. As for Nazism, would that its perverted rigidity and provincialism had been touched by something that would resolve away its grim self-obsession and inhumanity so alien to the spirit of the Fatherland, into wholesome amusement at its own Nordic self-importance — that so might come again the true Germany that sank beneath the waves of the Great War!

VII

The loss of humor, however, is not the only thing to be deplored. Equally regrettable is its abuse. For, like all pure and wholesome things, humor may become decadent and miasmic by falling into the moral degeneracy so finely rebuked by Thackeray (who better qualified than he?) in the person of the chivalrous Colonel Newcome in the first chapter of *The Newcomes*.

Hardly less dismal is it to witness the spontaneity of true humor so often smothered in conventionality or professionalism — pleasantry passing into paltriness, laughter lost in echoing emptiness, banter become banal by inflation. An increasing tendency toward a cheap form of humor is evident of late in not a few "columnists" whose witless witticisms in commenting upon current life and events add another to the demoralizations which make the average American newspaper of today almost an insult to an educated people. Excessive resort to humor has become more than a danger also in luncheon-clubbery, along with a painful liturgy of informality, reminding one of the comment made by a Yankee jurist concerning the founder of one of our

most famous luncheon clubs: "As we say in these parts, was he born so, or did he have fits?" There is much admirable fellowship cultivated in the group life of men's clubs and women's clubs, but a considerable amount of the humor, or attempted humor, exploited in clubs needs to be salted down or exposed to the satire which saves the humorist from himself.

There are times when humor is apt, illuminating, benign; there are other times when it loses its virtue and becomes wit either inane, intrusive, or painfully inconsequential. The lover of humor should always be ready to say: I could not love thee, dear Humor, so much, loved I not seriousness more.

VIII

Humor is as fugitive and indefinable as laughter — upon whose nature much philosophical and psychological speculation has been vainly expended. Yet, without attempting to analyze it, something may be said, perhaps, regarding the spirit out of which humor springs and the happy consequences which ensue upon its presence.

Whatever its proximate source, or psychological explanation, humor is a plant that springs from the root of *faith* — one might almost say religious faith. Indeed it is implicitly religious; for all genuine confidence in the trustworthiness of life and of one's fellow men has a religious quality, and humor is impossible without this. One cannot joke fraternally with anyone without trusting his intelligence, or at any rate his goodwill. No one can laugh goodnaturedly over human foibles, unless he has faith that humanity has something besides foibles. Humor is at times a mark of consanguinity, a kind of family trait. Witness the Beechers — all! Again it is an achievement of the solitary individual like Thoreau, or perhaps a sufferer like Hood, of whom it was said that he early "turned his stool into a Pegasus on three legs" and bravely rode it to the last. It was William Cowper, "the stricken deer," author of the noble hymn "God moves in a mysterious way" who also started John Gilpin on his hapless

ride down the streets of Humordom, on all sides thickly lined with lovers of the ludicrous. It was the homeless, famished fugitive of the streets of London, Francis Thompson, victim of slow tuberculosis, who wrote those exquisite fantasies, touched with a humor almost too delicate to provoke a smile, "Poems of Children."

A generous faith in life and in humanity belongs to humor, rather than to wit. For wit is caustic and attaches itself not to that which is kindly and uniting but contemptuous and divisive. It leaps like a Damascus blade from a concealed scabbard and spares neither feelings nor virtue. Wit may be of service in striking down sham and self-deception and stabbing the slumberous wide awake, but it is a dangerous weapon in the hand of ill-will. Wit was the lash of Aristophanes, the poignard of Voltaire, the stiletto of Swift; humor the lamp of Plato, the playmate of Shakespeare, the solace of Charles Lamb, the recreation of Lincoln. Often the two merge or conspire, yet, as has been so often pointed out, they are distinct in nature and in effects.

IX

Humor often seems illogical; rather it is superlogical. It substantiates logic by laughing at it. Only he can appreciate, and himself freely use, all the wealth of meaning and amusement in bad grammar who knows well the rules and refinements of good grammar. Nothing, e.g., can be at once so ungrammatical and illogical and at the same time so filled with sagacious nonsense as the double negative, culminating in *no nothin'*. How wide-ranging and eagle-eyed is humor, quick to seize upon the slightest sort of an occasion, a trifling incident, a diminutive word, and find in it volumes of mirth and meaning. That peculiar bit of nonsense, a *pun* (a word which evades the searcher of Skeats as clearly as does *fun*), when you examine it, is a mere correspondence in sound between the names of two contrasted objects, or ideas. Yet it stirs the fountain of inner mirth as jubi-

lantly as the sudden ripple of a wren's song, or the notes of a distant hand-organ coming down the street of childhood; or, like a spark in a powder cask, starts a veritable explosion of merriment.

Punning is not to be looked down upon as the mummary of superficial minds. Who was a more inveterate punster than Shakespeare? Alliteration, too, that happy blending of rhythmic sound with playful suggestion, is not beneath the catholic artistry of the great dramatist. Indeed the chief aristocrats of literature do not hesitate to patronize a good pun or seize upon a suggestive alliteration.

Nor should one close without reference to the gentle art of *repartee* — "come-back," as it is too commonly called — which lends so humanizing a touch of piquancy to every-day intercourse, although not infrequently the efforts made in its behalf resemble bruin dances more than the gambols of elves and sprites to the manner born, or the tripping of fairy footsteps. Skilfully administered, with due admixture of good humor, repartee comes near being true art. I once heard the father of a precocious youth introduced at an academic dinner as follows: "We will now hear from the Old Block of the Young Chip." Upon which the maligned parent arose and said: "I have heard of a father who was never permitted to be himself; during the first part of his life he was known as the son of his father and after that as the father of his son." A cruel fate, indeed! It is said that when Saint Thomas More and Erasmus (the latter of whom should have Protestant canonization) first met Erasmus exclaimed: "You are either Sir Thomas More or no-one!" to which More replied: "And you are either Erasmus or the devil!" This is recognition and repartee, compliment and causticity, in a nutshell.

X

Humor is Emerson's "merry sphinx," custodian of hidden wisdom, guardian and restorer of sanity. When Sentiment, heavenly guest, gets "loony" and is in danger of becoming

sentimentality, self-conscious and artificial, Humor — with a touch, sometimes gentle, sometimes harsh, but always kind — recalls sentiment to herself and subjects her once more to the control of right reason and reality.

Not only does humor sanitize; it also harmonizes. It creates a tie of mystical fellowship passing swiftly from mind to mind, and heart to heart, like a gleam of sunshine through a winter wood. For, like music, humor is one of those touches of nature (human nature) "that make the whole world kin." Nowhere is its presence more welcome than when it lights up the pages of literature, as in Addison, Dickens, Thackeray, Burns, Scott, Lamb; Goldsmith, Galsworthy, Thoreau, John Muir, Irving, Chesterton, Barrie, Bret Harte, the increasingly appreciated Mark Twain, and many another well-loved author, loved the more for this. In every-day life — else not in literature — among folk of all classes and conditions, humor lightens the burden of care and injects healing balm into even the sorriest mishaps of this, because of its presence, less "unintelligible world." Like mercy, humor "droppeth as the gentle rain from Heaven, upon the place beneath." It is twice bless'd. It blesseth him that gives and (especially) him that takes.

In *fnis*, then, let me propose; Health and long life to Humor, honored by the ancients as Thalia among the Muses, cherished by the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon fancy as Eulenspiegel and Robin Goodfellow, lured into literature by Shakespeare as Ariel, brought into the homes of the people for the children by Mother Goose (bless her heart!), Alice in Wonderland and Uncle Remus, and for the elders by the late beloved Mark Twain, and Josh Billings, Mister Dooley and Will Rogers, Thornton Wilder and other like public benefactors — welcome guest at even the lowliest feast of reason and flow of soul! May its refreshing stream not cease to cheer and enhearten us in our "o'erdarkened ways!" And may Divine Grace grant us, in the words of the well-canonized St. Thomas of England, "a merry meeting in Heaven!"

OUR FOREIGN LETTER

Philosophy in Italy Today

The situation after World War II is a direct consequence of the situation before World War I.

1. Then 'official' philosophy (i.e. philosophy as represented by most University professors) was in the main a vague form of eclectic 'spiritualism', in which relicts of the two outstanding *Risorgimento* philosophers, Rosmini and Gioberti, and a vague form of positivism sought for a common ground.

2. Against this, neo-hegelianism was struggling for position. Croce, nephew and heir of the Spaventas (of Bertrando Spaventa, a rather lonely scholar who strove to naturalize in Italy Hegel's philosophy, on the ground of a biased conception of the history of European thought) initiated a revision of Hegel's philosophy by enforcing the independence one from another of all fundamental aspects of spiritual activity (art, philosophy, morals) and by giving a paramount importance to art, which he interpreted according to the fundamental tenets of romanticism as 'pure intuition', i.e. mere imagination. He got a considerable following among men of letters, critics and others, who criticised historical methods in the study of literature in favour of an artistic appreciation. About 1911 the most promising follower of Croce, Gentile, split the neo-hegelian school by maintaining that all spiritual forms were at bottom one and the same, as every one of them was only a manifestation of the self. In this way Italian neo-hegelianism turned back towards Fichte.

3. Pragmatism was followed by a small set of young people, unconnected either with the universities or with broader philosophical circles. They sought to restate the original position of C. S. Peirce as against that of James but got neither a following nor a durable influence on Italian culture.

It must be emphasized that every Italian university (with the exception of the Catholic University of the Blessed Heart at Milan) is a State University. The appointment to an University professorship is made on the judgment of a commission chosen by the government among the professors of the same subject. On the other hand philosophy is an obligatory subject in all High schools. Therefore the general trend of philosophical thought in Italy is influenced:

1. by the philosophical bias of the older professors who want to shove into University chairs their former students and their followers;

2. by the government (the Department of Education) which is influenced both by its political affiliations and by its pet theories whenever the Department is led (as usually happens) by a University professor.

After the end of World War I neo-hegelianism gained ground rapidly. Croce became Minister of Education in 1920 and Gentile in 1922. Gentile initiated an extensive reform of the Italian system of education which was of course influenced by his philosophical theories. So that in a very short space of time the greatest number of University professors and High school teachers, both of philosophy and of cognate subjects, were devoted to neo-hegelianism. And as Gentile's neo-hegelianism was understood to be the best basis of Fascist political theory, neo-hegelianism had the steady support of the government. This had a determining influence on the philosophical situation as, after 1931, competitions for University and High school jobs were open only to members of the Fascist Party.

Both Croce's and Gentile's neo-hegelianism impressed on Italy's philosophical thinking and teaching three basic characteristics:

1. Both maintained that science is an imperfect knowledge, and valued art as more intimately related to philosophy than is science. Therefore Italian

philosophers lacked any scientific culture and their preparation was mostly of a literary kind. Psychology too was considered as an inferior and rather disreputable research and was almost completely severed from philosophy. There was no need of any sociological knowledge for a teacher of philosophy. Economics were a subject apart. As for politics Hegel's theory of the State, in the Fascist interpretation, was considered the natural result of any reasonable political philosophy.

2. Both Croce and Gentile maintained that the human spirit is real only in its historical development. Therefore history became the most important discipline, to be learnt and taught side by side with philosophy. Neo-hegelianism maintained also that the study and interpretation of the history of philosophy had the same result as a direct study of the problems of philosophy and as an independent statement of new systematic points of view. Instead of psychology, logic and ethics, philosophical teaching in the High schools was restricted to the teaching of the history of philosophy. Therefore philosophers did not go in for original thinking and historians who had no skill for philosophical research became leaders of philosophical thought.

3. Hegelianism gives an absolute value to the human spirit in its infinite development and maintains that God is only a projection of this development. Therefore Italian philosophers had neither interest nor feeling for religious problems. But Catholicism was considered justifiable, side by side with neo-hegelianism, as a historical expression of the Italian mind. Gentile himself directed that in every High school Catholic religion had to be taught as a part of the curriculum. Owing to the good organization of the University of the Blessed Heart and its financial standing, and to the Concordat of 1929, scholasticism became a possible rival of neo-hegelianism.

Under the sway of Fascism and neo-hegelianism Italian philosophers did not elicit any new philosophical system. They dealt mainly with historical researches, and neo-hegelianism interpretations of old philosophers.

During the Fascist period they could be classed roughly in three 'schools':

1. Neo-hegelians of Gentile's persuasion. — Croce was against Fascism and was admired and followed mostly by critics and men of letters.

2. Neo-scholastics. — Many who had got a professorship in consequence of their allegiance to Gentilianism, went over to Catholic faith and philosophy as soon as they had got their job, partly owing to a natural discontent with a philosophy without any religious content, partly owing to the power of Catholicism in Italy and to the coming over of Fascism to downright clericalism after the Concordat. Other neo-hegelians sought for a blending of neo-hegelianism and Catholicism, and some strange conceptions appeared in consequence of this desperate attempt at preserving neutrality or a divided loyalty.

3. A few could reach a chair through the protection given to them by their old University professors who were the relics of the 'spiritualistic' and semi-positivist currents prevailing before the assault of neo-hegelianism.

A new element appeared about 1936-1937. In Germany existentialism, initiated by Heidegger in 1927, had infected at once everybody with a philosophical enthusiasm which very rapidly declined and died. Italian philosophers, who had no settled systematic opinions and were skilled only in historical interpretations, found in rough and ready existentialism a rather easy new philosophy. Existentialism became fashionable in Italian universities, without yet producing any really new development or interpretation. The lack of any critical basis in existentialism, its highbrow obscurity, the unlimited possibility of juggling with words and high-flung phrasing afforded by it gave a heaven-sent opportunity to philosophers who sought for something new so as to cut out their former compromise with Fascist neo-hegelianism and to escape the faintly musty smell of old 'spiritualism' and semi-positivism.

So that today the prevailing currents are a Catholic philosophy, more or less

indebted to neo-thomism, and a vague existentialism.

Interest for psychology is restricted. Philosophers look down upon it, as if it lacked any philosophical significance. No original theories or researches have appeared. But something can yet be hoped in the near future owing to a slow growth of interest for psychological researches, due mostly to the fact that now American and English books are widely diffused and Italian scholars begin to understand the paramount place given to psychology (and to sociology too) in Anglo-American studies.

Logic is almost completely forgotten. In ethics no new theories seem likely to appear. Historical studies rather than original thinking are yet a ruling interest with philosophers.

But even among philosophers the fashion leans now towards politics — not as a science but as party politics. Having been so long deprived of political freedom it is quite understandable how Italian minds should now turn eagerly to party politics as to the forbidden fruit. Unfortunately there is neither a tradition nor a preparation for political thinking. Many philosophers are artlessly trying to accommodate their particular brand of philosophy to the tenets of the party toward which their rather naive feelings lean. Communism and Christian Democracy seem now to be the fashion amongst Italian philosophers.

To list some outstanding names:

1. Croce does not have any political interest any more. Anyway he writes mostly about politics (in a Liberal sense) and letters. (Gentile was shot in 1944.)

2. Antonio Banfi (University of Milan) has not yet evolved a distinctive and complete system of his own, but he can be considered one of the best minds in Italy. His thought grew from a wide knowledge of the soundest and more recent German philosophers (Husserl, etc.) and his theory of 'knowing' is an outstanding accomplishment. — Pantaleo Carabellese (University of Rome) has evolved a special interpretation of Kant, independent from both neo-hegelian and neo-thomistic preconceptions. He sees in Kant's criticism of reason the basis of a new ontologism.

3. Amongst the older philosophers one should recall the profound logician Annibale Pastore (formerly of the University of Turin) and the brilliant student of aesthetics Adelchi Baratonio (University of Genoa).

4. Some names (Della Volpe, Sciacca, Abbagnano) amongst the younger professors could be quoted as of really acute minds from which some new departure in the field of systematic philosophy might be expected. But their prevailing historical interest or their proneness to the existentialist fashion has hitherto hampered them in the research for a personal conception. — On the other hand after 1931 only members of the Fascist Party could get University appointments and therefore the youngest professors cannot be supposed to feel any strong urge towards a philosophical expression of their personality and towards independent thinking and research.

MARIO M. ROSSI

University of Florence
June 1946

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

A Subscriber Writes

Dear Editor:

Referring to the recent article in *The Commentary*. What a totally erroneous conception Dewey has of Personalism. It puts the Individual (in his opinion) "in opposition to Society". That is the only kind of relation that is vital and healthy. Not only does the Individual, The Person, stand *opposed* to Society, but the persons are opposed to each other. This opposition, however, is one of competitive co-operation, not destructive rivalry. Unfortunate is he who has no competitor in seeking truth.

Twice in his article, Dewey quite casually rejects that most beautiful and logical of all definitions of Religion — I have a collection of over two hundred — that definition that has been going strong now for two thousand years — and will go echoing and re-echoing down through all the unending years of human time, "Love God with all your heart — and your neighbor as yourself." Great men have re-affirmed this in each generation. Cardinal Mercier, who defied the Kaiser and lived, said to a very large Protestant audience when he visited this country after the first World war, 'The brotherhood of man is the logical corollary of The Fatherhood of God.'

"Religion blushing, veils its sacred fires
And unawares morality expires."

I have always made a distinction between a *tie* and a *bond*. Someone said, "Cursed be these human social *ties* that warp us from the living *Bond*." And Love it is, that in its essence *is* what it *seems* — it alone can both bind and tie. "Love is both linch-pin and girdle." (Kagawa).

Through his whole life Dewey has often admitted the very thing that he denies. He first borrows the Idealists' wonderful insight and then disavows the debt. He once described Religion as "the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole." Then he makes this amazing statement, "Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the Universal."

H.

Letter From An Interned Advisory Editor

Dr. C. C. Hahn, whose letter we append, has had a long and distinguished career as an educator in Korea. Receiving his Doctorate from the University of Southern California in the late twenties, he taught for a number of years in the Union Theological Seminary at Seoul and later at Ewha College where he was at the outbreak of the war. He is the author and translator of a formidable list of books most of which have formed texts for college use in Korea. Among these was a translation into Korean of the Editor's *Creative Personality*. His books were published by special sponsoring of the Wildon Carr Publication Fund of the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California and included texts in History, Sociology and Psychology as well as Philosophy.

There is added interest in the fact that Professor Hahn was the first graduate student to receive the doctorate in Philosophy at the University and possibly the only American doctor among native Koreans. His release in reasonable health is a source of great gratification to all his friends. The letter follows:

Dear Dr. Flewelling:

What pleasure to write you again after so long a break! The world is again triumphant for democracy, the freedom of man. Korea is delivered from thirty-six years of slavery. My personal life is also saved as I was kept in prison up to the very hour of the Japanese surrender, the fifteenth of August. It took me half a year to recover my health. For some time I have worked in the Political Education Section, U. S. Military Government in Seoul. I am writing and translating materials for democratic education and I take this opportunity to study the ideals of democracy myself as these are new to this people. Our head is Dr. Cleland, Ph.D. of Boston University, a friend of the Personalism of Dr. Bowne. I am fortunate to work with him.

Freedom of speech and thought will allow me to continue my literary work so cruelly suppressed by the Japanese. I expect a new day for my writings. The Japanese language is gone and the revival of the Korean language and culture is now in full swing.

With all best wishes from Korea,

Yours faithfully,

C. C. Hahn.

ALONG THE BOOK SHELF

The Aesthetic Experience

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS. By *Milton C. Nahm*. Harper and Brothers, N. Y.

Although Professor Nahm's book does not claim to be a fundamental treatise of Aesthetics or a complete survey of the many aesthetical theories which have seen the light since the days of Plato, it is so thorough in its examination of the field of investigation proposed by its title, and so rich in important quotations, as to allow the reader to extract from its profusion of material and thought, a very comprehensive synopsis of aesthetical history and methodology.

In order to analyze the problem of aesthetical experience, the author states Plato's famous definition of Beauty in the *Philebus*. Two distinct schools or points of view have opposed each other, one of which he names the Ateleological Theory subdivided into the Transcendental and the "Concrete" forms. In opposition is the group of teleological theories of Art and Aesthetic experience, subdivided into Non-aesthetic as exemplified by Rodin, and the theory of Art as symbolizing the artist's feelings.

In spite of his elaborate and very fair presentation of what he calls the Ateleological point of view, the author is frankly a partisan of the Teleological Theory, showing that the apparent initial discontent created in the perceiver by profoundly moving art destroys only temporarily a certain equilibrium, which as in mystical experience, is established on a higher level. Profoundly moving art thus becomes "freeing" art and a most effective "energizer" of man's spirit. The author does not however show clearly why Ateleological Art should not sometimes produce the same effect. To quote Professor Nahm's conclusion:

There is exaltation in the experience of all art that moves men profoundly, and gives them cour-

age to face a world always to some degree, and at times brutally inimical to their desires, so that in profoundly moving art they may enjoy the symbols of their achievements.

The author shows quite correctly that nearly all the problems connected with aesthetical theory and practice are already set up and discerned in Plato's *Dialogues*. Plato's influence on the aesthetical theories of Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, the Neo-Thomists (Maritain especially) is proved by a wealth of quotations.

Professor Nahm dwells at great length upon the most startling aesthetic antinomy presented by Plato: his expulsion of the poets and of emotional art (tragedy and most kinds of music) from his ideal state, in contrast with other standpoints where the products of art are shown to help men attain mystical union with Beauty, bringing back to the soul "order and consonance with itself." The author points out that Aristotle's theory of catharsis, the healing and purgation of the soul moved by tragedy and music is the best answer to this apparent contradiction. This point of view is elaborated in the Second Part where he explains how the initial "discontent" created by moving art can be transformed into exaltation and courage.

The only logical objection that could be raised against the author's analysis might be that he identifies Plato too much with the Ateleological view, whether as protagonist of absolute beauty or partisan of "concrete form in Art and Nature." One could to the single Ateleological pronouncement of the *Philebus* oppose many others in which Plato develops the conception of the unity of the work of art considered as an organic whole, even as a living organism with a unity due to order, measure and proportion, producing harmony and consonance (*Philebus*, *Gorgias*).

This new and unwonted antinomy does not, however, detract from the value of the work. The original presentation of its theories and the fulness of its documentation make it profitable reading for those interested in Aesthetic theory or in the direct enjoyment of beauty.

Matila Gykha.

A PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY, based on Thomistic Principles. By the Reverend John Duffy. Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C.

The reader not especially interested in Thomistic doctrine might open this book with certain apprehensions of endless Scholastic disquisitions dissecting the important subject-matter anatomically and ontologically into artificial categories, and fastening to them multiple and ponderously characteristic labels. Such a fear would be entirely unjustified. Father Duffy's very interesting treatise has nothing pedantic about it, one might even say nothing dogmatic. This is true in spite of numerous but aptly chosen quotations from the works of St. Thomas himself, and from his commentators.

An additional and important contribution to the quality of this dissertation, submitted for the Doctoral degree, is that the author shows a deep understanding and feeling for Art in general and for Poetry in particular. In fact he gives the impression of being a poet himself.

In spite of the title, the work is not only a Philosophy of Poetry, but a complete treatise on Thomistic Aesthetics. Having developed (in more than half of the book) his point of view about the nature and experience of beauty, and the psychology and metaphysics of art, the author dwells upon the nature and metaphysics of poetry. He shows himself in a very stimulating chapter on Words as having mastered the works of the recent Semanticists, Carnap, Morris, Ogden and Richards, and Hayakawa, as well as the latest studies on style and poetry.

An unexpected note is what one

might call the "liberal" attitude of St. Thomas on art which is summed up in the following sentence: "Whatever the proportion of the work of art to the individual beholder, if it perfectly represents the pattern in the artist's mind, to that extent it is perfect, and therefore ontologically beautiful: its caused proportions perfectly carry out the intended exemplar".—a straight advocacy in Platonic terms of "Art for art's sake".

Similar concepts are applied in the second part of the treatise dealing more specifically with poetry. The titles of the successive chapters show clearly the trend of the argument: "The Genesis of a Poem"; "The Operative Word"; "The Metaphysics of Poetry"; "The Experience of the Poem". The author sets down the rules allowing one not only to find out what a poem actually is, but also to understand its beauty, corresponding either to a *splendor entis* or to a *splendor secundum propriam formam*, or to both. The sub-chapter on words is especially interesting, combining on the one hand the Thomistic terminology which classifies words as pure concepts, expressed concepts, and word-images, and on the other hand, very up-to-date semantics.

Even about the domain of modern poetry which may be classified as difficult or obscure to the normal reader, the author shows a tolerant attitude by quoting T. S. Eliot: "There is a logic of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts", charitably admitting that "a sequence of a thousand images which does not carry any unitary meaning to the intellect" may have a sort of "fragmentary splendor."

This work is to be warmly recommended to those interested in aesthetic theory.

M. G.

High Lights of Literature

THE DEATH OF VIRGIL. By Hermann Broch. Translated by Jean Starr Untermeyer. Pantheon Books Inc., New York, N. Y. 1945. Pp. 493. \$5.50.

This is a very unusual book and will

no doubt be received with widely divergent reactions. In the first place, it falls into no recognizable category, for it is a combination of history, novel, lyric poetry, and mystical vision. The translator, who in a lengthy note presents the difficulties which she faced in her four-year task, calls it a poem. A more accurate term would be "prose poem," with the connotations of such poetic prose familiar to readers of De Quincey, Emerson, and Edgar Allan Poe, but on a far larger scale. But it is more than a mere prose poem. It is a gigantic inner monologue, with which are incorporated lengthy conversations, descriptions of people and scenes, philosophy, vision, and brooding upon death and immortality. Finally, it is highly symbolic, as evidenced by its division into the four parts, designated "Water—The Arrival," "Fire—The Descent," "Earth—The Expectation," and "Air—The Homecoming."

The frame of the work is the last hours of the poet spent in the palace of Augustus the Emperor at Brundisium, to which he is carried on a litter from the ship that brought him with Augustus from Greece. After passing through the filthy and wretched streets of the city, up the hill to the palace, amid the execrations of obscene women, he is carefully ministered to in a room of the palace, is visited by his friends from Rome, Plotius Tucca and Lucius Varius, has an imaginary amorous meeting with the legendary Plotia Hieria, is persuaded by Augustus, after a lengthy conversation, that he should renounce his intention to destroy the manuscript of his great epic, and finally fades into immortality so imperceptibly that the reader is not really sure that he is gone.

But within this framework occur all the mental experiences of the dying man. Probably no one who has not suffered a long illness, been troubled with delirium, and been very close to death can understand the otherwise unaccountable shifts from the real to the imaginary, the abrupt disappearance of persons from Virgil's room, the sudden sensing of the presence of great crowds of persons and animals, the uncertainty

of knowing whether what we hear and see is really being enacted or is only an hallucination. As in a dream, there are no adequate transitions. Conversation becomes monologue. Our ears are assailed by the most realistic obscenity, sometimes from apparently real persons in the street outside, sometimes from persons of the poet's fancy. Then we pass to the most poetically beautiful descriptions of landscape and human figures. And over all, there is the constant mystical atmosphere of a great poet viewing Rome as an epitome of life, disappointed over the futility of his epic, and brooding upon the immensities of life, death, and immortality.

As the translator has made plain, one of the greatest difficulties in rendering this work into English was the intrinsic differences between German and English. The sentences are often interminably long, and the English reader is not accustomed to the great host of composite words which, in German, permits of a "many-dimensional expression." He is impatient at the long sentences and finds the accumulation of adjectives merely boring. The classical scholar will of course find fault with the perversion of facts, with the mingling of truth and legend, though at the same time he will be pleased with the many echoes of the great lines of the *Aeneid* that are interwoven into the monologue.

All in all, this was a *tour de force*, both for the author and for the translator. It is also somewhat of a *tour de force* for the reader, who is disturbed with the feeling that, while he is laboring with the obscurities and mysticism of a prose narrative, he is missing the beauty and the vision of a poetic illumination.

Louis Wann.

GEOFFREY CHAUCER OF ENGLAND.
By Marchette Chute. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. 347. \$3.75.

Most of us know nothing of Chaucer's life except that it is something to which we are often referred, which everyone seems to know about and which almost nobody knows. If we

do not find ourselves included in that category we may be one of those who had *The Canterbury Tales* spoiled for him by having taken a course in Old English somewhere in our verdant youth, and having wrestled with what was made for us useless verbiage. There is still another group who both know Chaucer and who enjoy him.

If you happen to be in the first class there may be a thrilling literary moment for you in the reading of Miss Chute's *Geoffrey Chaucer*. You will find yourself directed and intrigued, first of all, into returning to the school-book Chaucer of your college days and discovering how readable it is without the constant reference to foot-notes which dogged your student efforts. In the second place, you will profit by the delightful comment on Chaucer and on the text which Miss Chute presents. Her fullness of knowledge and her charm of literary expression, to say nothing of the delightful initial letters at the head of the chapters, drawn by her hand, will make it difficult to lay the book down until you have finished it. The style and the content remind us of the work of C. G. Moulton, for it possesses the same appeal to those interested in Medieval life and literature.

After her comments, you will scarcely refrain from reading *The Canterbury Tales* all over again and getting an enjoyment never before known to you.

Chaucer's times, his close relations with the court, the problems he faced as a public official, the sources of his literary inspiration, his journeys on the continent, the political situation of 14th century Europe, the social conditions of the English nation, Chaucer's knowledge of and appreciation of the common people, all these matters are discussed with erudition.

Not without interest, is the account of the attitude of the clergy toward Chaucer's work. Being secular, it was considered more or less of the Devil, and for his frivolity Chaucer was truly repentant in his latter days.

Perhaps Chaucer died of the

plague, for 1400 was a plague year. It is to be hoped that he died quickly for he did not die in peace. Deschamps once spoke of the way the unending ringing of bells can trouble a sick man, but it was more than the heavy bells of Westminster Abbey that Chaucer heard ringing in his ears.

Chaucer was still trying to make his peace with heaven, and as the hour of the final rites approached he was overwhelmed by his sense of sin. According to the testimony of Gascoigne, he was no longer content with having retracted all his poetry. He wanted to call it back and destroy it, because most of it was based upon the evil subject of the love of men and women. And of this, Gascoigne, a distinguished Oxford churchman of the period, grimly approved, for he compares Chaucer's death-bed repentance with the final hours of still another traitor to Christianity—Judas Iscariot.

Chaucer was buried in the cloister of Westminster Abbey in the place now called the Poets' Corner, not because he was one of the greatest poets England would ever know but because he had been a tenant of the Abbey grounds. His friends sent up a heartfelt prayer for the safety of his soul, and Hoccleve even pointed out to the Virgin that Chaucer had frequently written lines in her praise and therefore she ought to intercede for him.

So died Geoffrey Chaucer, trying to the last to make his peace with his century and the God of his century. He left behind him the men and women he had created and they went on without him, subject neither to medieval laws nor to medieval penalties. The condemnation is forgotten, but Criseyde and the Wife of Bath are not. They are more real now than any of Chaucer's contemporaries, and they will continue to be real five hundred years hence. (p. 321).

In only one respect can we criticize Dr. Chute's treatment of history. On page 37 she tells us of the definite division of the seven liberal arts into the trivium and quadrivium as having been "mapped out by a ninth century German educator." How could she, after writing so fine an appreciation of Boethius, have omitted him from the mention of the "Seven Arts" to say nothing of his contemporary Cassiodorus? The format and impression of the book calls too for commendation, for it is a pleasant book to own.

R. T. F.

WALT WHITMAN HANDBOOK. By Gay Wilson Allen. Packard and Co., Chicago. Pp. xviii & 560.

For nearly a century Walt Whitman has been the object of controversy so fierce that nearly all that has been written about him has been tinged by prejudice either for or against him. Now Professor Allen in the *Walt Whitman Handbook*, comes forward to gather up the broken threads of discussion, to fill up the gaps in previous views, and to evaluate from a neutral standpoint. So well has he met these objectives that we have what will remain for a long time a definitive work, although in his modesty he has assumed to call it only a handbook. His work has been done so thoroughly that many points of mystery and misunderstanding have been cleared away. There is first, a chronological table, then a presentation of the biography in the light of the most recent information, then comes a consideration of the various changes that represent the growth of Whitman's concepts in *Leaves of Grass*, and the other poetry up to the final edition. There is a chapter on the Social Thought of Whitman, another discussing the literary techniques in *Leaves of Grass*, and another on Whitman's place in world literature. All of these serve further the comprehension and appreciation of Whitman's work which Americans have been slow to accord the value that was in the very beginning assessed by Emerson, who by his recognition called down the wrath of

the Puritanically minded. The third chapter on "Whitman's Fundamental Ideas" is the one that all personalists will wish to read and dwell upon for the author shows how Whitman was the first American at least to use the term personalism, and perhaps the first anywhere to use the term in its present generally accepted philosophical sense. As one reads this chapter under the guidance of the author, he sees how closely Whitman does conform to the leading ideas of modern personalism, though he was quite unconscious perhaps of many of the philosophical implications of his doctrines. The journals of Emerson and Alcott are drawn upon to show how Whitman's standpoints influenced them, though Emerson was never quite weaned away from his pantheism, and did not take the advanced ground of Alcott. The study of the relation of the personalistic movement to Transcendentalism, to the St. Louis School, to Howison, and to German transcendentalism is intriguing. The work of Bowne in New England seems to have been naturally placed though it is improbable that Bowne was conscious of all the influences that were directing his thought. As a matter of fact, personalism is the natural assumption of any theistic philosophy. It comes intrinsically to those who are convinced of the reality and validity of moral and spiritual truths, and who are yet unwilling to yield everything to the dogmatisms inherited from the past. It is natural to the spiritually-minded who continue to believe in human freedom. More than any other philosophy it is American, American in the sense of being in line with the American dream of Democracy. That it should find its culmination in America is no accident but one of the expressions of American life.

Professor Allen has done us a great service in providing this discussion of Whitman and, in the future, whatever one's studies of Whitman may be this Handbook will furnish an indispensable guide.

R. T. F.

SPRING OF HELLAS AND OTHER ESSAYS. By T. R. Glover. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 210. \$2.75.

Perhaps the most charming of all volumes to come recently from the press is Thomas Glover's *Springs of Hellas*. It serves to remind us of the unutterable loss suffered in his death by the literary and intellectual world, for it seems to us now that he belonged to a rapidly disappearing species, the classical scholar. But even more than that his power lay in his capacity for literary expression in making the past seem living and contemporary. No one who has profited in the past by his writings will be willing to let slip the chance to own this volume. In spite of its brevity, and its posthumous publication it is the equal of any of his others. His charming style, his acquaintance with classic literature and ancient history, above all his insight into the salient points of that history have enabled him to write a book that one will read again and again. Once you have finished it you feel constrained to begin it all over.

It is attended by an excellent but too brief biography which throws light on many passages of his writings. Attention is called to the sensitiveness of Glover's disposition. It seems in some measure due to what the psychologists would call an "inferiority complex" due to his non-attendance on the English Public School and non-membership in the Established Church. This characteristic gave him a hair-trigger disposition, of which the reviewer once had personal experience. It is indicated also by numerous petty flings at the United States, some of which like the comparison of William Jennings Bryan to the River Platte "hundreds of miles long, eighteen inches deep and a mile wide at the mouth". Such a statement, not germane to the discussion discloses an unfortunate psychology, however apt the figure of speech. These weaknesses can, however, be overlooked in the presence of the genuine values that pack the book.

FOUR ESSAYS ON "GULLIVER'S TRAVELS." By Arthur E. Case. Princeton University Press. Pp. 133. \$2.00.

In issuing *Gulliver's Travels* in 1726 Motte the publisher, who proceeded without benefit of proofreading by Swift, by and large did the printing conscientiously but made certain alterations and omissions for fear of being prosecuted, and fell into some inadvertent errors to the subsequent confusion of geography and chronology. Professor Case finds, however, that Motte's text, as corrected the same year by Charles Ford, is superior to that issued in Dublin in 1735. He also argues tellingly for the composition of the first two books between January, 1871, and July, 1722; of the fourth by January, 1724; and of the third by August, 1725.

Turning from strictly textual to interpretive problems, he produces evidence that Swift alluded to more personalities and happenings of English political life than scholars have assumed, manifested greater personal modesty and greater loyalty to ungrateful if high-stationed friends than he has been given credit for, and integrated his work as a whole beyond what incautious readers have surmised. Professor Case interprets the volume as not only a powerful satire but a positive contribution to what Swift believed to be right principles of government and sane attitudes to religion.

G. G.

BEN JONSON: POET. By George Burke Johnston. Columbia University Press. Pp. ix, 175. \$2.00.

Sundry comments always made upon Jonson have unfavorably affected understanding of him. The constant contrast with Shakespeare would be a handicap to any writer. The reputation for classic learning does not entice readers. Even the salutation "O rare Ben Jonson" suggests a personage to be charily approached by ordinary mortals.

Modern criticism, fortunately, has begun to study Jonson for himself. The volume under review is concerned with his nondramatic poetry, not only subjecting it to first hand scrutiny but bringing to its appraisal the results of such special inquiries into background

matters as Douglas Bush's probing of Renaissance modifications of classic mythology and Louis B. Wright's research into Elizabethan middle-class culture.

The investigation shows Jonson writing both seriously and satirically, and therefore often contradicting himself; in judging him the world has tended to disregard all his personal references except the satirical ones. The investigation further shows that, so far from being classically erudite and nothing else, he was steeped as well in the popular lore, customs, and traditions of Englishmen. Hence he is to be related to his time, and his reputed misogyny and misanthropy must be accompanied by the extensive evidence of his appreciations and loyalties.

G. G.

THE AFTER IMAGE. By *Lucile V. McCurtain*. The William-Frederick Press, New York. Pp. 46. \$1.00.

THE TRAGEDY OF SAUL OF TARSUS. By *A. Judson Arrick, D.D.* The Exposition Press, New York. Pp. 123. \$2.50.

The two volumes here considered differ greatly in form, but are similar in that the first is in part and the second altogether a gleaning from fields left by the reapers. The first consists of lyrics, in most instances metrical but usually unrhymed, on natural scenes or artistic — especially musical — compositions which have inspired the author. The second is a presentation in blank verse, with interspersed lyrics, of the life of the apostle Paul. Though called a tragedy and employing dialogue, Dr. Arrick's work has long passages of narrative, meditation, or discussion; it also is intended for reading rather than acting.

G. G.

Men and Nations

THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE. By *Lynn Harold Hough*. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1945. Pp. 367. \$3.00.

Readers who watch avidly for the literary excellencies that flow from the pen of Dean Hough will hasten to possess themselves of this latest volume on

The Meaning of Human Experience. Personalists will be most interested in the first section of the book, "Basic Considerations". Though Dr. Hough would probably prefer the term Humanist as an appellation, and side-steps Personal Realism for Personal Idealism there is general agreement with the Personalist position.

He begins by insisting on the priority of a theory of knowledge over a theory of reality. This is doubtless true so far as philosophical thinking is concerned though in actual experience we seem always to have a definite opinion on what constitutes reality before we are very conscious of the thinking process. The author does not hold as do some that having a theory of knowledge we can get along without metaphysics, for the two are inseparable and mutually dependent.

At times his criticism grows sharp as when he charges the anti-free-willists with the prejudice of libertarian morality. Again he calls attention to the decadence of modern psychology into physiology in an effort to reduce the world of thought to the world of things. Yet again he points out the weakness of Crisis Theology when he states:

We are being betrayed, not by thinkers who are committed to falsehood, but by thinkers who have mistaken the part of truth they have seen for the whole truth. (p. 213).

In an earlier passage he calls attention to this same depreciation of the human mind on the part of such thinkers as Niebuhr and Barth at the same time they possess an infallible confidence in their own conclusions:

For the purposes of a very noble sense of man's dependence on God, they discredit the very power without which all argument—and especially their own—is made invalid. (p. 26).

Dean Hough is altogether sound when he calls attention to the fact that the most direct and immediate form of knowledge is man's awareness of himself and that in creating man an agent of knowledge and decision God has

already disclosed to him the nature of reality. The deepest meaning of life also "lies in the adventure of the self with other selves." Of the world religions he writes:

To avoid controversy about definitions we may content ourselves here with saying that no people or tribe has been discovered which has not something that answers for it the purposes of religion, whether we think it respectable enough to be dignified by that name or not. . . . From Greek historians and geographers we have accounts not only of the religions of the civilized peoples of their times, but of many barbarous tribes in all parts of their world. They nowhere discovered irreligious men. . . . The universality of religion within the range of our knowledge warrants the inference that it has its origin in a common motive. (p. 70).

In the later sections of his book the author seems bent on fulfilling the requirements of a philosopher defined as "the spectator of all time and all existence" for in these pages he deals with world religions, world literature in a dizzying survey that can only be superficial because of the number of items involved. Yet many will find inspiration in these casual forays into many fields under the inimitable guidance and attractive style of our literary Dean.

R. T. F.

ROSENBERG'S NAZI MYTH. By *Albert R. Chandler*. Pp. IX, 136. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1945.

This book contains an informative exposition and a reliable critique of the Nordic or Nazi myth as set forth in Rosenberg's famous, or perhaps it would be more accurate to write infamous book entitled: *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit*. This work of over 700 pages is almost as important among the voluminous literature of National Socialism as Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

Professor Chandler gives an interest-

ing account of Rosenberg and of his book in Chapter I, and proceeds to expound the author's conception of the great race of Nordics in Chapter II, and the anti-race (Jewry) in Chapter III. He explains how Rosenberg used, or rather misused "The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion" to stir up and intensify his campaign against the Jews. "The trend of his discussion is to show that the Jews caused the French Revolution, the World War, and many other evils, and that they covertly and openly exercise great financial and political power." (page 39).

Chapter IV expounds Rosenberg's treatment of Christianity under the following headings: Jesus and Paul, Teutonism versus Catholicism, and Meister Eckhart's Mysticism. Professor Chandler then elaborates Rosenberg's philosophy in Chapter V. "The philosophers for whom Rosenberg shows the most respect are the early Hindu mystics, Meister Eckhart, Leibniz, Kant, and Schopenhauer." (page 61). In theory of knowledge Rosenberg is anti-intellectual and mystical. His philosophy is dominated throughout by the concepts of race, and of honor and related values. Religion is turned into a tribal mysticism. In a summary of Rosenberg's theory of art Professor Chandler writes:

"Art for Rosenberg is an expression of the racial soul. The best art is that which the Germanic artist produces in his struggle for self-expression. The worst art is that which the money-seeking Jew contrives for its effect on his audience." (page 91).

Turning in Chapter VI to "Criticisms and Rebuttals", Professor Chandler deals effectively with Rosenberg's controversy with Catholics. He gives in some detail the Catholic criticism of Rosenberg's *Mythus* in the extremely rare anonymous composite work entitled: *Studien zum Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, which Rosenberg answered in *An die Dunkelmaenner unserer Zeit*. This is followed by a short account of Rosenberg's controversy with Protestants. The material in this Chapter is especially informative for

anyone interested in the effects of Rosenberg's Nordic myth on Christian theologians. At the end of the Chapter Professor Chandler gives his own evaluation in which he succinctly states: "The *Mythus* is brilliant propaganda for evil ends."

There is a closing Chapter on "Rosenberg in Action" which deals with his personality and status, his attitude toward England and Russia, and toward the churches. An Epilogue summarizes the results of the study and valuable notes are appended. There is a good index.

Although this book was written before the surrender of Germany, it is a permanently valuable addition to the literature essential to an understanding of National Socialism.

D. S. R.

THE UNITED STATES MOVES ACROSS THE PACIFIC. By *Kenneth Scott Latourette*. Harper & Brothers, New York. Pp. ix, 174. \$2.00.

Few people are so well fitted as Professor Latourette to discuss "The United States Moves Across the Pacific." He calls attention first to the march of destiny westward which has long characterized Western civilization and which had achieved its culmination in the founding and development of the United States. This movement, as he justly notes, is too deeply ingrained in the habit and philosophy of Western thinking to be resisted.

We have already gone too far in this Westward movement (which really began with the Mongol Cart moving away from the Central Asian plateau), to be able to avoid the consequences. We are unalterably committed to participation in Asiatic affairs. Our stand for the integrity of China, our sponsoring of the National Government of China, our occupation of Japan and Korea, our hold upon the mandated islands, our guarantees of the Philippines, all of these demand an active and long continued role in Eastern affairs.

This role is a particularly difficult and perplexing one and Professor Latourette discusses the problems inherent in

the situation with an intimate knowledge arising from first-hand acquaintance.

If any criticism is to be made of the book it is its too great brevity. As it is, however, it presents one of the best summaries of contemporary problems. It raises questions commonly overlooked in political discussions of issues of the day, questions which must be posed before there can be any adequate solution of our ills.

R. T. F.

THE FIRST AMERICANS IN NORTH AFRICA. William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates (1799-1805). By *Louis B. Wright* and *Julia H. Macleod*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1945. Pp. 227.

If one desires a microscopic picture of American diplomacy, retarded military action, surrender of essential principles in appeasement, use of national disadvantage for the purpose of embarrassment of the ruling administration, military and naval jealousy and general finagling he will find it all mirrored in this most interesting book, *The First Americans in North Africa* by Louis B. Wright and Julia B. McLeod. Our early histories managed to make a glorious war out of our success with the Barbary Pirates but there were devious passages and our Uncle Samuel had to be swung into action before he would take efficient steps to protect his own citizens against enslavement. Nor was the situation without international complications. Britain was quite complacent with any situation that could embarrass the commerce of the rising Republic and was not wanting in undercover intrigue. So America had to struggle alone with the Pirates and winning from them the desired peace. We have here in little the picture of internal jealousy and political wrangling which detracts from any feeling that such troubles as we now suffer were foreign to "the brave days of old". We have here a story of surpassing interest and a real though brief contribution to our historical literature.

R. T. F.

THE ANNIHILATION OF MAN. A study of the Crisis in the West. By *Leslie Paul*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. Pp. 214. \$2.50.

Here is another war book, published during the last months of the conflict, and written by one who was sharing military life. The age, so runs the author's thesis, does not rest on solid foundations. We witness the fruit of a failure of spiritual idealism and the dominance of materialism. The world crisis is the result of a general disease of Western civilization, an eclipse of our moral and ontological vision, and the rise of a cynical doctrine of man and his life. The totalitarian philosophies, backed by political and military power, share in a cynical doctrine of man that has already appeared under the form of the economic man, the Darwinian man, the Freudian man, the reflex man. In the author's words:

What happened to Darwin has in a way happened to the whole of Western civilization: it ceased to understand or to value, as a whole, anything but the materialist interpretation of the universe; its spiritual life has therefore fallen into decay; it is no longer able to think in terms which would give it release from its prison. A blinded Samson, it brings down the temple. (p. 191)

In spite of the fact that this book was written during the war, it is still worth reading. Its larger challenge is that of the spiritual character of our age, of which the war, which is indeed not over, was but one manifestation. The author's analysis of the spiritual forces behind Nazism, Fascism and Russian totalitarianism is still of value, and his book as a whole prompts us to rethink the spiritual as well as the material and political situation in which we still find ourselves. The authentic solution to our quest for moral truth the author finds in Christianity, but in a Christianity freed from its perennial enslavement to the weakness of scientism, namely, that of literalism.

Wilbur Long.

A CENTURY OF LATIN-AMERICAN THOUGHT. By *William Rex Crawford*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Pp. 320. \$3.50.

Intellectually the two Americas resemble hermit nations, in that either has been painfully oblivious to the intellectual achievements of the other. Both have taken their cues from the old world; the United States being influenced primarily from England and Germany, and South America looking for guidance to Spain and the other Latin countries. About the only influence in common has come from France, and in the case of North America unfortunately the predominating influence has from that source been French Positivism in almost total neglect of French Spiritualism. This philosophical blindness on our part has had not a little to do with the fact, that only now are we waking up to the necessity of greater educational contacts with our southern neighbors, and finding it difficult to bridge the gulf of understanding between us. Latin America has had a long, distinguished and important role in the history of philosophy of which we have been totally ignorant. At the same time while South America has been enthusiastic over our political ideals, we have gone on in blundering indifference. In truth the philosophical ideals of a people determine their political ideals in a way seldom accorded by proponents of the economic basis of history. One of the most immediate needs in the present situation is the new understanding that can be built only on knowledge of and respect for each other's intellectual achievements.

Toward this end William Rex Crawford in his *A Century of Latin-American Thought*, has done a distinct service for mutual understanding. He discusses the great leading thinkers of Latin-America, giving the salient points of their philosophies. These he takes up nation by nation and to those who have not already acquainted themselves in some measure with South American thought, the extent of that development will come as a surprise. Our Latin neighbors have held philosophy in

much higher esteem than have we, and for this very reason our surest meeting ground with them is intellectual, and here we have held but little converse. Mr. Crawford's book will form a most valuable handbook and guide to future students, and is provided with a very complete and invaluable bibliography of South American philosophical writings.

R. T. F.

CHINA: A MODEL FOR EUROPE. Two volumes in one. Vol. I: China's Economy and Government Admired by Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europeans; Vol. II: Despotism in China, a translation of the work of Francois Quesnay, by Lewis A. Maverick. Paul Anderson Company, San Antonio, Texas. Pp. xii & 334.

A common criticism of the Russians is the benighted state of public information that is said to lead the average Russian to believe that his own people are the inventors of electric lights, telephones and the other impedimenta of modern civilization; that he refuses to believe that these gifts are possessed by the rest of Europe and America. A similar type of provincialism may be charged against Western civilization with relation to China. As yet the only History of Philosophy to treat practically the impact of the Orient on our own philosophical concepts, at least to our knowledge, is that by Dr. B. A. G. Fuller. We have been equally belated respecting the sources of the Enlightenment in Europe and the rise of the Physiocrats and Utilitarians. We think of the work of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and our other political economists as if they had grown in a vacuum, without any natural political parentage. The histories of the future will have to give more space to those constructive influences that have reached us from the East, and this is especially necessary in these days when the world hopes to achieve common understandings.

Lewis Maverick, in *China: A Model for Europe*, has done us a significant service by pointing out the growth of Enlightenment Political theory in France and England and in tracing its

origins to the new knowledge of political practice in China. This is augmented by the first English translation of the work of Quesnay, first of the Physiocrats. The book has a timely interest and should find a wide reading. Dr. Maverick is to be congratulated on bringing his long researches to successful issue in a book all publicists should read.

R. T. F.

A CHINESE VILLAGE, Taitou, Shantung Province. By Martin C. Yang. Columbia University Press, N. Y. Pp. xvii & 275. \$3.00.

A good companion book to that by Professor Maverick would be Martin Yang's *A Chinese Village*, which gives a true picture of Chinese peasant life as seen by a long habitant in the rural districts of China. It goes farther than any other book I know toward giving a complete picture of the physical, social and mental life of the Chinese masses. It provides an understanding of Chinese habits, points of view, economic limitations, and intellectual aspirations. Along with these we get other clues to Chinese character, his passiveness under suffering, his philosophical reaction to life, his sense of humor, his strong endurance, the intricacies of his family, social and village life. Without the information here given it is practically impossible for the westerner to appreciate Chinese reactions in governmental and political affairs, and here all is set down with plain exactitude that goes far toward assisting understanding. In these days of new and growing interest in China the book provides needed enlightenment unadorned by the romanticism of fiction which is too often misleading.

R. T. F.

On the Death of Deity

GOD IS NOT DEAD. By Bernard I. Bell. Harper's, New York. Pp. 185. \$1.50.

Twenty-two sermon addresses have been collected under the covers of one book. The title is taken from the first. Through many years Dr. Bell has

wielded a vigorous pen. Here the well-vestried churchman sets out from replies by correspondents who discussed "Real Spiritual Problems of Mature People." The answers have a familiar ring. They avoid laying the ax at the root of the tree. Not larger literacy nor better distribution of creature comforts, but "religion is needed." The curse of pride is laid on respectable people who need God. The world will pass away, but God will live on. On the issues of wealth, social problems, and politics, the church has the right to speak out. What will it say?

Three presuppositions underlie these discussions. First, the scientific and the religious interpretations "are discontinuant". Second, modern civilization lacks permanent value. Third, the nature of God is revealed in the perfect manhood of Jesus. The cloistered world of an irrelevant church has again been certified for a new term.

I. G. W.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S EPISCOPATE. By N. J. S. Simpson. Macmillan, New York. Pp. 144.

The religious world appears to be destined to remember the "greatest of all Christian teachers since St. Paul". St. Augustine had served as Bishop of Hippo nearly forty years. As a young man he had wandered afar seeking peace of mind. Upon him came the responsibility of differentiating Christian doctrines from rival religious movements and developing them for an infant church. Rome had fallen in 410. The conqueror moved across Spain and down to Africa. For fourteen months his city had withstood the siege. Although he died before that fatal day, he had lived under the cloud of invasion and vandalism for many years.

Augustine has done the thinking for the church for a thousand years. Once again a comparable stress of soul that leads men to cry out for assurance has summoned many an anxious person to look in his direction. This little book is an excellent guide. Here the reader will discover the archetype of churchmen who are willing to make reason a

handmaid of faith for the sake of faith in some external authority. Here is religion bent upon psychological certainty at the cost of logical evidence.

I. G. W.

THE FLOWER OF GRASS. By *Emile Cammaerts*. Harper's, New York. Pp. 175. \$2.00.

Since 1933 the author has occupied the chair of Belgian Studies at the University of London. In seven succinct chapters he sets down some reflections with simple directness and literary charm. These topics have to do with a personal religious pilgrimage. From an elementary confidence in a humanistic credo, the writer moved to what he calls Christian faith. Along the way many a gem is to be found. For instance, speaking of 19th century bourgeoisie, he writes: "They cultivated their conscience as a gardener cultivates a sunless garden". It is apparent that he speaks as a layman, and not as a philosopher.

Cammaerts writes a great chapter on "Medievalism and Humanism". Often he joins the familiar chorus of idol-breakers who slay "education" and "reason" and ridicule "human goodness". He knows he is not a constructive theologian. He flies straight into the arms of an authority that is lodged in a supernatural world, the kingdom of God. But what does God say? 'There's the rub.' He points a direction, but does not designate the steps to be taken. Nevertheless, the wise man sees that he is on the trail of urgent truths, and is glad that Professor Cammaerts has written so forcefully out of the depth of a sincere mind. What he says is refreshing, despite the apparent abstractness of terms. When man is set over against God, it is time to examine the presuppositions.

I. G. W.

GOD AND THE ATOM. By *Monsignor Ronald Knox*.

In *God and the Atom*, Monsignor Ronald Knox has clearly and brilliantly raised and discussed the religious problems connected with the invention and

use of the atomic bomb. He cites the exclamation of an Army nurse upon receiving the news of Hiroshima: "Now I know there is no God," and shows how shallow and unwarranted is such a conclusion. He is equally critical of those thoughtless religionists who are blind to the social consequences and who continue to look at such an event from an altogether other-worldly standpoint. While admiring the unshakable faith of these to whom individual salvation is all that matters he is aware of the short-sightedness of such a position. There are two important respects in which religious thought is affected.

One of these is the moral problem involved in the use of the atomic bomb. The author feels that at this point we are due for an increasing sense of guilt and shame in having used it as we did, putting ourselves more or less on a level with the Japanese in their sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. He wishes we had not used it but had given notification of its possession with the comment that we would not resort to it because we did not consider its use honorable. Failing this he would have had us at least demonstrate it where human lives were not at stake. Of course the moral problem comes stark up against the ethics of Christianity and those ethics do not sanction war. What justification there might be the author finds in the prevention of further slaughter by the aggressor.

The other concerns the character of God. Monsignor Knox shows the relation of freedom to moral character and that the responsibility for the misuse of natural gifts lies with man himself. He points out that suffering may be as salutary to man as comfort and success, and that after all these are not the true goal of man but rather the achievement by man of moral character and spiritual self-realization. The greatest of all dangers would arise from the use of the atom to "shoot us back unprepared, into the vortex of prosperity." If on the other hand its discovery can bring us to a profounder consciousness of moral and spiritual obligation its presence will become a blessing. Blessing or

curse however, depends not upon God but upon men.

Everyone should read and give thoughtful attention to this book which is profound in analysis, clear in statement, and liberal in thought.

R. T. F.

Miscellaneous

THE PROFANE VIRTUES. Four Studies of the Eighteenth Century. By *Peter Quennell*. The Viking Press, New York. Pp. 220. \$3.00

Beginning each of his studies in the early seventeen sixties, Peter Quennell here deepens our acquaintance with four of the most interesting figures of the following period—James Boswell, Edward Gibbon, Laurence Sterne, and John Wilkes. Each of the four is presented separately, though now and again the trails cross. Each is shown intimately and yet objectively. Each is made more authentic through the disclosures of recent scholarship. Boswell in particular, seen in his own light rather than primarily under Johnson's shadow, grows proportionately with the documentary evidence made accessible in late years.

Diverse as the four men are, each is "obsessed by an idea"—Boswell of biography made vital, Gibbon of classic majesty and detachment, Sterne of sentiment and fantastic style, Wilkes of personal and political freedom. Each attaches to himself "some distinguishing features" of an era "ruled by the profane virtues of sincerity and moderation." Thus the four literary solos supplement each other to produce something of an eighteenth century symphony.

G. G.

HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT. By *Robert Ulich*. American Book Company, 1945. Pp. 412. \$3.00.

One of the most difficult and serious problems in the teaching of the history of education has been concerned with the choice between history as the development of the school as an institution, its techniques, practices, and organization, and that of the successive theories

of distinguished thinkers in the field. Up to the present time the first point of view has prevailed very largely and the philosophies of education have been subordinated to the more concrete aspects of school practice, although a few later books have tried to combine the two. The book being reviewed represents a frank acceptance of the ideological point of view and presents the history of education in neat essays or summaries of the teachings of the great figures in educational thought through the centuries from Plato to John Dewey. Each method of approach has its own peculiar difficulties. The institutional and practical is likely to underestimate the creative and underlying forces of human personality which in the long run motivate all social movement. On the other hand a study limited to the theories or philosophies of individuals, no matter how outstanding those individuals may be, may fail to catch the ongoing and developmental aspects of the history. It may also be unintelligible to inexperienced students who cannot give content to abstract concepts.

Professor Ulich's essays are based upon an enormously wide range of reading and a profound grasp of European philosophy. They present a fair and penetrating digest of the work of the writers with whom they deal. The critical estimates are made with great insight. The major problem of our times in the philosophy of education is correctly stated as follows:

The future of education will depend on its capacity to bring about two closely interrelated syntheses, the one being that of science and our spiritual tradition, and the other that of the demands of the state and the individual conscience of man. These two problems are but reflections of a still deeper concern of the human race. So far, man's reason and social planning have not been able to comprehend the wholeness of the human person and the totality of the conditions under which he can

develop fully. . . We lack both a comprehensive psychology of the nature of man and comprehensive social ethics. Therefore education has not been able to cope with the rapid modifications in all aspects of civilization. Can we simply preach the gospel of "adapting youth to the changing needs of society"? Must we not have principles to determine which challenges, in the welter of opportunities, we wish youth to accept and which to refuse?

Only with such a comprehensive knowledge of the fundamental conditions of man and his civilization can we distinguish means and ends and dare be revolutionary with respect to the instruments of society, without being destructive of the deeper and permanent interests of man. (pp. 35, 346.)

Merritt M. Thompson.

THY HEALTH SHALL SPRING FORTH. Readings in Religion and Health by Russell L. Dicks. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1945.

This little book of seventy pages, by the Chaplain of Wesley Memorial Hospital in Chicago, is a compilation of one valuable essay and several inspiring prayers and poetic meditations. The title of the essay is "God and Health", and most of it is quoted from Dr. Richard C. Cabot. He wrote it originally for the book *The Art of Ministering to the Sick*, prepared by Dr. Cabot and Chaplain Dicks.

All of the material is especially well chosen and appropriately arranged for the use of ill persons. The book would make a good gift to present to a sick relative or friend, or to a hospital, or to anyone ministering to patients.

D. S. R.

PROPHETS AND PEOPLES: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism. By Hans Kohn. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 213. \$2.50.

A Prague-born and German-trained scholar who has spent the last fifteen years in this country here adds to his

investigations of nationalism. It is a truism to say that the nationalistic trend became more conscious and powerful in the nineteenth century. Through analysis of the teachings of John Stuart Mill, Michelet, Mazzini, Treitschke, and Dostoevsky Professor Kohn clarifies the reasons why nationalism took its respective bents in England, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. In the belief that in very great measure "thinking makes it so," he has carefully appraised key thinkers and the public reactions to their ideas. He has enabled readers to see many things not too obvious before — how French distrust of England on account of past rivalries has been wellnigh fatal to France herself, why the Italian course has been futile, why the discords of our era have been so shattering. He shows that many beneficent Germans—Jakob Grimm, Carl Schurz, and Thomas Mann among them—have at one stage or another lent impetus to the baleful Pan-German mission. And he makes out an extremely strong case for regarding Dostoevsky, whom he hails as perhaps the supreme literary genius of the century, as molding animosities and fanaticisms which point to direr holocausts than have yet cursed mankind.

G. G.

ETHICS & LANGUAGE. By *Charles L. Stevenson*. Yale University Press, 1944. Pp. 336. \$4.00.

Ethics & Language might well be considered a necessary propaedeutic to the science of ethics. It is an attempt to analyze and clarify the nature of ethical judgments and to distinguish between ethical and scientific meanings. Ethical statements differ from scientific statements in that ethical statements have a meaning in part factual and in part imperatives. Controversial ethical issues involve a disagreement of a dual nature, namely, in belief and in attitude, and the central problem of ethics is to see how these are related. Beliefs are held to be preparatory to guiding and redirecting attitudes.

The main section of the book consists of two sets of patterns each with

two parts. First, the two patterns of analysis, and second the two patterns of ethical method. The first pattern of analysis restricts the descriptive meaning of ethical terms to the speaker's own attitudes, for the purpose of removing their vagueness. The second pattern of analysis allows the descriptive references to become as complex as the context requires.

The first pattern of ethical method is illustrated by a set of ethical judgments showing how ethical arguments are carried on. The general outline of first pattern methodology is as follows: "Any statement about any matter of fact which any speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgment." In the second pattern of ethical method the definitions are persuasive. They consist of a combination of descriptive (neutral) and emotive (non-neutral) meanings.

In a concluding chapter on the practical implications of the study the author sets forth suggestions for an ethical methodology for those who would write in the field of normative ethics. Both sides of normative questions should be examined, and all relevant knowledge of a factual scientific nature about human nature and its environment should be considered. Persuasive methods may legitimately be used with mature and intelligent readers. Even empathy may be used for the purpose of making his readers project themselves imaginatively into the position of others.

H. L. S.

LOGIC. By *A. Gratry*. Translated by Helen and Milton Singer. The Open Court Pub. Co., LaSalle, Ill., 1944. Pp. 628.

The original French edition of *Logic* was published about the middle of the nineteenth century. It is not a logic text in the orthodox sense, but primarily a treatise on Induction. The syllogism is treated incidentally, and the work contains in addition a section on The inspired Intellectual Virtues, which argues for the place of faith in knowledge, and a section on The Sources of Intellectual Light, which contains prac-

tical rules for study and self-development.

The reasoning process falls into two divisions, namely, deduction, and dialectic or induction. The principle of the syllogism is that of identity. It is analytic and does not discover more than is contained in its point of departure. Induction, on the other hand is not analytic, but transcendent, and is the method of discovery of new truth. These two methods work together and mutually support each other, in that what is discovered in induction can often be demonstrated by deduction. The problem of induction is how the mind can pass from the same to the different, and discover unity underlying differences. Baconian induction is groping and results in probability, but there is an induction which leaps forward toward a law, the very essence of which is found in the infinitesimal calculus.

After an exposition of dialectic as presented by Plato and Aristotle the science of the 17th century, especially that of Kepler and Leibniz, is used to illustrate the infinitesimal process. The main point of the argument is illustrated by the circle inside of which a polygon is expanded. The inference from the polygon to the curve is by the method of limits. Since there is no possible way of transition from the polygon to the circle by the method of deduction or identity, the logical legitimacy of the method of induction from the finite to the infinite is insisted upon. He admits that this mathematical infinite is an abstraction, and that he is not trying to prove the existence of God, or the concrete infinite.

While these views were worked out prior to the developments in non-euclidean geometry, the relativity theory, and the contemporary philosophy of science, he had a worthy antagonist in M. Monneret who insisted that inductions in physics do not leave the domain of the contingent. His reply to this criticism is that modern physics (on the authority of Newton) is the reduction of facts to mathematical laws, and that mathematical laws do go beyond the domain of the physical.

The defect of the present work from the viewpoint of the twentieth century developments is in the assumption that the same rigor which has been achieved in the field of geometry can be applied to metaphysics and the sciences of nature. It is not denied that the achieving of a rigorous deductive system is the ideal of science, but the relation of mathematical symbols to the contingency of nature is not as clear or as certain as it was in the nineteenth century.

Herbert L. Searles.

ABBOT SUGER: On the Abbey Church of St. Denis and its Art Treasures. By *Erwin Panofsky*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. 250. \$3.75.

Panofsky's translation and annotation of Abbot Suger's description of the Abbey Church of St. Denis may well be considered the definitive work on this great gothic structure. Surely no one who has wandered through the aisles and cloisters of this most historic of all French churches can afford to miss the information here given. The tomb of French Kings, at times, the seat of government, Abbot Suger was the principal in its enlargement and ornamentation. Suger lived also in the most interesting period of its existence and in one of the most fascinating eras of European history. His connection with the monastery as an oblate in the days of his predecessor Adam when Bernard of Clairvaux pronounced it "the synagogue of Satan" and during the time when Abelard had to escape from the Abbey for disclosing the false claim of Dionysius the Areopagite make his a fascinating history.

Not least of all was the liberalizing influence of this physically diminutive man in the custom of the Church, in architecture, and particularly in theology and philosophy. (Inate p. 36).

On the more human side we have the story of the clever means by which he added to the rich ornamentation of the church by putting wealthy visitors "on the spot", and by way of bargaining despoiling the treasures of Chartres itself.

In addition to this fascinating infor-

mation we have Suger's own account worthily translated in parallel pages and the most valuable and extensive scholarly annotations of the editor.

R. T. F.

OPPORTUNITY IN ALASKA. By *George Sundborg*. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. Pp. ix and 302. \$2.50.

For all who are interested in Alaska, and especially for those whose attention has been drawn to the territory by reports brought back by returning veterans, this book is a necessity.

Though provided with a foreword by the present Governor of Alaska, it is not a Chamber of Commerce blurb to induce quick settlement. It discusses not only the opportunities but warns also of the drawbacks.

Discussing the extent of the territory, the climate, the people, and the attractions of the country in the first part, the second is devoted to the various possible careers, in forestry, agriculture, livestock raising, out-of-doors

life, construction, transportation, trade and the professions. To the general reader it gives valuable information about this, our as yet undeveloped empire, and our last frontier.

R. T. F.

HOW TO PICK A MATE. By *Clifford R. Adams and Vance O. Packard*. E. P. Dutton & Company, New York. 146. Pp. 215.

This is a book full of sound advice on the problem of marriage and such as might advisedly be put into the hands of young people. It is quite different from the pornographic type of book that so generally sails under these colors. There is no reasonable phase of the marriage question omitted and all based on a correct psychology. Dr. Adams, the author, writes out of years of experience as Associate Professor and Director of the Counseling Clinic of Pennsylvania State College. Altogether the sanest book on the subject we have met up with.

R. T. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- TOLSTOY: AN APPROACH. By *Janko Lavorin*. The MacMillan Company, New York. Pp. v, 166. \$2.00.
- RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD. By *Max M. Laserson*. The Macmillan Co., New York. Pp. x, 275. \$2.50.
- RIGHT THINKING. By *E. A. Burt*. Harper & Bros., New York. Pp. 764.
- FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS. *Rector Dr. Salvador Zubiran*. Universidad N. de Mexico. Pp. 168.
- FIRST AMERICANS IN NORTH AFRICA. By *Louis B. Wright* and *Julia H. Macleod*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. Pp. 225. \$3.00. Reviewed in this number.
- THE A PRIORI IN PHYSICAL THEORY. By *Arthur Pap*. Kings Crown Press, New York. Pp. xi, 102. \$2.00.
- THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Abraham Edel*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. Pp. xii, 475. \$3.00.
- RELIGION IN AMERICA. By *Willard Sperry*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xi, 318. \$2.50.
- THE IMPORTANCE OF RURAL LIFE, According to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. By *George H. Speltz*. Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C. Pp. 184.
- GOD AND THE ATOM. By *Ronald Knox*. Sheed & Ward, New York. Pp. 166. \$2.00. Reviewed in this number.
- AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE: ANTISEMITISM. By *James Parkes*. Penguin Books Inc., New York. Pp. v, 153. 25 cents.
- DIOS Y LA FILOSOFIA. By *Clarence Finlayson*. Universidad de Antioquia, Medellin, Columbia. Pp. 262.
- CHINA A MODEL FOR EUROPE. By *Lewis A. Maverick*. Paul Anderson Company, San Antonio, Texas. Pp. 334, xi.
- CHINA AND AMERICA. By *Foster Rhea Dulles*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. Pp. vii, 277. \$2.75.
- IN THE NAME OF SANITY. By *Raymond Swing*. Harper and Brothers, New York. Pp. xii, 116. \$1.00.
- THE CHRISTIAN FUTURE. By *Eugene Rosenstock-Huessy*. Charles Scribners' Sons, New York. Pp. xii, 248. \$2.50.
- ROBERT BOYLE—DEVOUT NATURALIST. By *Mitchell Salem Fisher*. Oshiver Studio Press, Philadelphia, Pa. Pp. v, 184.
- EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS. By *Alexander Meiklejohn*. Harper Brothers, New York. Pp. xi, 303. \$3.00.
- THE FORMAL DISTINCTION OF DUNS SCOTUS. By *Maurice J. Grajewski*. Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. Pp. xv, 211. \$2.25.
- THE GEOMETRY OF ART AND LIFE. By *Prince Matila Ghyka*. Sheed and Ward, New York. Pp. xvii, 174. \$4.00.
- GREATER GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY. By *Wade Crawford Barclay*. Willett, Clark & Co., Chicago, Ill. Pp. ix, 257. \$2.50.
- LIVING ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY. By *Harold H. Titus*. American Book Co., New York. Pp. xi, 436. \$3.25.
- THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL THINKING. By *Dorothy Emmett*. The Macmillan Co., New York. Pp. xi, 238. \$3.00.
- PREFACE TO PHILOSOPHY. By *Hocking, Blanshard, Hendel, Randall, Jr.* Edited by W. F. Tolley. The Macmillan Co., New York. Pp. x, 508. \$2.50.
- TOUR D'HORIZON PHILOSOPHIQUE. By *Matila C. Ghyka*. Librairie, Gillimard, S. P. Pp. 197.
- TOWARD PEACE AND EQUITY. Recommendations of The American Jewish Committee. The American Jewish Committee, New York. Pp. xiii, 152.

LA PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE DE BERGSON. Par *Lydie Adolphe*. Preface de Emile Brehier, Membre de l'Institut. Presses Universitaires de France.
ANAMOREFOSIS TRATADOS FILOSOFICOS. Por *Edmundo Solorzano Diaz*. Ediciones "Oriente," Mexico. Pp. 322.

MONOGRAPHS

THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF THE FORMS OF INDIAN SOCIETY; INDIAN CULTURE AND ENGLISH INFLUENCE; and EAST AND WEST. By *Ananda K. Coomaraswamy*. Orientalia, New York. Pp. 51.

